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Tiivistelmä: 
Tutkielman tarkoituksena on tarkastella keskeisiä kysymyksenasetteluita liittyen 
kansainvälisten rahoitusmarkkinoiden sääntelyyn. Tarkoituksena on luoda 
yleistajuinen esitys, millainen säänneltävä ilmiö nykymuotoiset rahoitusmarkkinat 
ovat. Tutkielma esittää historiakatsauksen ja yhteiskunta- sekä taloustieteiden 
näkökulmia rahoitusmarkkinoiden kansainvälistymiseen. Juridinen perusongelma on, 
että rahoitusmarkkinat ovat aidosti kansainväliset, mutta sääntely on kansallista. 
Tutkielma pyrkii näyttämään, että Euroopan unionin ja Yhdysvaltojen 
sääntelyviranomaiset voisivat toimivaltansa puitteissa kohentaa sääntely-ympäristöä 
keskinäisen yhteistyön kautta. Tutkielman tarkoituksena onkin esittää näkökulmia ja 
pohdittavan arvoisia kysymyksiä tulevan mahdollisen sääntely- ja valvontayhteistyön 
pohjaksi. Tutkielmassa tarkastellaan sääntely-yhteistyön juridisia ongelmakohtia 
ottaen esille perusoikeuskollisiotilanteita, joita sääntelyviranomaisten tulee punnita 
sijoittajansuojan ja tehokkaan pääomanmuodostumisen välillä. Samaten tutkielmassa 
puntaroidaan sääntely-yhteistyön elementtejä pakottavan lainsäädännön ja soft law –
lähestymistavan välillä. 
 
Avainsanat: Kansainväliset rahoitusmarkkinat, arvopaperimarkkinaoikeus, 
sääntelyteoria, kansainvälinen sääntely-yhteistyö. 
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PART I CONTEMPLATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS – 
HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL ASPECTS 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Perspectives on financial markets 
Finance has revolved around all human activities for centuries if not 
millenniums. As Roy C. Smith puts it “[financial profession’s] frequent 
association with ‘the world’s oldest profession’ may simple be because it is 
almost as old”. Environment of finance is universal. Smith determines it as 
follows “any situation that involves money, property or credit, all of which are 
commodities that have been in demand since humankind’s earliest days”.1 
Market is considered as a concept of exchange for goods, commodities and 
services. Financial market is a concept of exchange for financial commodities 
and services (“financial product/s” or “product/s”). The exchange, trade and / or 
use of such products are all defined as transactions. The financial products 
have been invented to facilitate trade, commerce and investment and to 
accommodate the accumulation, preservation and distribution of wealth by 
states, corporations and individuals.2 
The actors on financial markets can be described by various terms and 
definitions. The markets include suppliers and users of funds, intermediaries, 
service providers and regulators.3 Therefore on this respect actors could be 
systemized on five main categories: 
i) Issuer or borrower; user of the funds.  
ii) Investor, depositor or lender; the supplier (saver) of the funds. 
iii) Intermediaries; actors between the users and suppliers connecting 
supply and demand. 
iv) Service providers; acting as supporting function for the financial 
transaction without direct involvement in it. Providers include clearing 
                                                     
1 Smith 1997, pp. 1-16. 
2 Smith 1991, p.1. 
3 Scott 2012, p.1. 
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platforms that transfer securities, information providers as rating 
agencies and e.g. lawyers that draft the contracts for transactions. 
v) Regulators; governmental bodies that can be national or 
international. They supervise and regulate the actors on markets.  
It is notable that numerous individual entities operating in the financial markets 
hold several aforementioned positions at the same time and even sometimes 
they might hold multiple positions on the same particular transaction. For 
example imagine a situation in which government is issuing bonds (issuer) that 
it should supervise (regulator) and the buyer of the bonds (investor) to be a 
company in which the government has a stake as a shareholder. This all 
together creates quite a complex system to picture, understand and control. 
If not delved more deeply into financial terms and history, at this point, it can 
be concluded that the operational environment of financial markets have varied 
during centuries. There have been times of open cross-border interaction and 
times of protectionism in relation to sovereign states. Depending on the 
definition there are and have been several regional and / or national financial 
markets acting individually and separately on different eras. The 21st century 
financial markets are often referred as international and / or globalized. 
Sometimes international financial markets are considered as a one whole. This 
does not exclude the fact that to some extent financial markets have always 
been international and to some extent the financial markets are still to be 
considered national. How it can be argued, on juridical terms, that 21st century 
financial markets are international; and how international they are (cross-
border perspective)?4 
Definitions for international financial transactions vary depending on the view 
point (economic, political, sociological, or legal). Also in legal sense 
international connection can be determined in multiple ways. In order to be 
international factual transactions need to have some cross-border and / or 
multi-jurisdictional aspects. 
                                                     
4 In this context “cross-border perspective” means that transactions have certain cross-border and multi-
jurisdictional aspects. Amount of cross-border and multi-jurisdictional elements can be seen as a scale 
of internationality, as it will be contemplated further on this study. On the other hand, national markets 
are concept in which all transactions are explicitly conducted under one jurisdiction. 
  3  
In Private International Law it has been systemized that one of the three 
following characters need to be in use before a transaction or a factual case 
can be considered to have a link to Private International Law: 
1. Question over international jurisdiction: which tribunal is competent 
to solve the possibly arising civil disputes pertaining to the transaction 
and / or which tribunal has a jurisdiction regarding possible criminal 
proceedings?5 
2. Rules on choice of law: which law shall be applied to the transaction 
and which law applies to the possible civil disputes in case they occur 
and need to be solved or which law applies to possible criminal 
proceedings that might take place?6 
3. Recognition and enforcement of judgments: is there a need to apply 
or summon enforcement actions on a different jurisdiction than under 
the jurisdiction of the judicial system in which the resolution has been 
delivered?7  
The aforementioned definition of juridical international engagement suits for 
certain purposes, especially for case law orientated approach. In generally, on 
the field of International Law of Property it is common that dispute resolution 
clauses and law references are agreed in contract when parties enter into 
agreement on particular transaction. This might be the case also among 
financial transactions. In fact there are instances where contractual choice of 
law and extraterritorial application of regulations make law itself an additional 
independent factor in making transactions international.8 
Financial transactions (national and transnational) are mostly covered by 
mandatory legislation due to the authorities’ interest to effect on capital 
formation, protection of investors and control the systemic risk under its 
jurisdiction. Also, authorities’ interests may revolve around preventing frauds. 
The nature of international financial markets, and therefore international 
                                                     
5 Stone 2010, p.3. and Klami 2000, pp. 15-18. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Scott 2012, p. 2. 
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financial transactions, can be considered more complex environment than 
regular commercial transaction landscape which has international connection. 
Simply due to the reason that financial transactions, usually, have the 
regulated market place and the products are also under special regulatory 
scrutiny and control in comparison to e.g. international trade of plywood. 
National authorities tend to have a higher interest in extending their regulatory 
mandate when it comes to financial transactions. Therefore possible 
international engagements and conflicts of interest may occur more frequently 
than in “regular” commercial transactions. Thus definitions and interpretations 
of international financial transactions are challenging at times. The aspects on 
why authorities tend to have an interest to regulate financial markets and 
transactions (national and transnational) are dealt more closely in Section 3 of 
this study. 
The financial transaction, to be considered international, needs to involve 
some cross-border activity with respect to payment, credit or investment.9 This 
definition originates from the thinking that parties of the transaction are located 
in two different countries. It can be concluded that regulators in both parties’ 
jurisdictions may claim to have an interest in such transaction10. Suitable 
addition to the aforementioned definition might be Bryant’s typology of 
international financial transactions which includes the claims on domestic 
residents11 in foreign currencies12. In generally, the key factors in determining 
the international character of a financial transaction are: i) location of 
transaction, ii) residence of the parties and iii) currency of denomination. 
These factors have also historically determined the law governing the 
transaction and regulators’ authority over it, unless contractually agreed 
differently in case deviation from governing laws is possible.13 
The definitions and notions presented above are worthwhile to keep in mind 
throughout the study. Definitions on financial transactions’ internationality in 
perspective of International Property Law as well as regulators and supervisors 
                                                     
9 Dufey 1990, p.3. 
10 Scott 2012, pp. 1-5. 
11 Note: residence is distinct from citizenship. 
12 Bryant 1987, p. 26. 
13 Scott 2012, pp. 1-5. 
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intrest on cross-border financial transactions are essential for this Thesis. The 
economic and political analyses of the historical developments and 
contemporary aspects of the operational environment on international finance 
will be assessed. Before making any juridical implications the phenomenon 
itself needs to approach. Though, while focusing as comprehensively as 
possible on international financial markets as a socio-economic phenomenon 
the juridical aspects are reasonable to bear in mind. 
 
1.2 Variety of approaches to confront the (international) financial markets; few 
historical perspectives  
“...a new man, who has his way to make in the world, knows that…changes 
are his opportunities; he is always on the lookout for them, and always heeds 
them when he finds them. The rough and vulgar structure of English 
commerce is the secret of its life…” 
- Walter Baeghot14 
“…one of the main objectives of financial law and regulation is to mitigate the 
risk of breakdown.” 
- Philip R. Wood15 
Aforementioned quotations present two distinguishing approaches and 
features to financial markets. They reflect the debate around questions: to 
regulate or not to regulate, and if answering yes; how to regulate. 
To put it bluntly: The first quotation describes the mind-set from which arise the 
innovations of new financial market products. Products that at best might 
provide prosperity, products that at worst might plunge the financial system 
into chaos. On the other hand the second quotation stems from the aim to 
avoid a “breakdown” that might occur if the lucrative financial innovations, shall 
prevail in the markets without proper control. 
                                                     
14 Baeghot 1873. 
15 Scott 2012, foreword. 
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Baeghot’s creative approach derives from the belief to capacity of cunning 
humans who can provide success not only for themselves but also 
environment around them by their eagerness for commercial wisdom. This is 
to be considered as a typical pro-market economist’s view of the markets. 
Aforementioned words were written on an era when United Kingdom (“UK”) 
was still on the top of its colonial euphoria and London’s Lombard Street was 
the undisputable “The Street” on the world of finance. 
Mr. Wood’s risk orientated perspective reflects the view which has evolved 
from the lessons of various financial market crises during previous centuries. 
His thinking seems to set into the position that ongoing crises and continuous 
threat of financial structure’s breakdown needs to be taken as ever looming 
possibilities. It can be thought his legalistic opinion stems from the urge for 
certain new regulatory initiatives for international financial markets e.g. 
regulatory / supervisory cooperation.  
These two, still quite pro-market, perspectives are not directly comparable nor 
do they rule out each other. They have solely been selected hereto in order to 
illustrate the variety of views and conflict in opinions that churn and have 
churned for centuries in discussions concerning the financial markets; even 
among pro-market thinkers.16 This conflict of opinions and chosen 
perspectives is a continuous debate that affects throughout the theoretical and 
practical field on research field of economics, politics, and law. 
The variety of opinions, which state back to the question on characters of 
human nature, makes the purely legal approach to the topic challenging. 
Therefore while discussing the issue in a juridical context it needs to be 
remembered that economic and political disputes are very much to determine 
the contemplated issues. In this study certain key assumptions, pertaining to 
economics and politics, need to be predicated even though these mentioned 
                                                     
16 Preceding chapters are solely interpretation and individual thinking of the undersigned. In fact it is 
worth to mention that Walter Baeghot was also advocating how to avoid panic when the markets were 
on turmoil; nevertheless he was a strong believer of human innovations on financial products. It should 
also be acknowledged that both aforementioned views are, in principle, in favour of international market 
economy. In the era of economic uncertainty, which we are still enduring to some extent at the moment, 
there are well argued critical voices against the international market economy system as a whole. In this 
study the existence and legitimacy of international financial markets and international market economy 
have been taken for granted. 
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sciences might have a lot to debate on these assumptions. Nevertheless, in 
order to complete a fluent juridical study certain predications need to be made 
to some extent. 
 
1.3 Defining the Study 
This study is to focus on the critical perspectives and possible future 
landscape for regulatory cooperation mechanisms on the international financial 
markets. One important part of the Thesis is to contemplate and illustrate the 
international mandate for certain regulatory / supervisory organisation. 
Financial markets shall be scrutinised as a socio-economic phenomenon, in 
light of history and the contemporary operational environment. This approach 
is necessary in order to understand which activity is to be put under juridical 
examination. 
The perspective of the study is juridical. To some extent the international 
financial markets are examined as a whole and at some points the main focus 
shall concentrate solely to securities markets.17,18 The more specific regional 
touch shall concentrate on the transatlantic aspects of the possible regulation 
mechanisms; particularly contemplating the European Union’s (“EU” or the 
“Union”) regulation to the corresponding one in the United States of America 
(“U.S.”) in order to discover means of cooperation and convergence for 
authorities and market supervisors between these jurisdictions. Therefore 
purpose of the study is not only to present prevailing legal state or current 
landscape of regulatory debate but also to discover certain possibly useful 
elements for forthcoming development in relation to convergence mechanisms 
and regulatory cooperation mainly on transatlantic financial markets. 
The Thesis does not involve case study due to the reason that there is a lack 
of jurisprudence pertaining to the recent regulation and / or convergence 
methods presented on this study. The differences between legal origins, i.e. 
Common Law vs. Civil Law, and their relation to hinder the possibilities of 
                                                     
17 According to Hal S. Scott, see Scott 2012, p. 11, the major financial markets are foreign exchange, 
lending and securities (debt and equity) and derivatives.  
18 I prefer the definition of International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in which 
‘securities markets’ are also used, where the context permits, to refer compendiously to the various 
market sectors (also reference to derivatives markets). See IOSCO 2010, p.3. 
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regulatory development are mainly excluded from the study. In this study the 
goals for sound financial regulation are to be reflected mainly on the light of 
three objectives of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”): 
1. Protecting investors, 
2. Ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; 
3. Reducing systemic risk.19 
Though the approach of this study is juridical it circles around economics and 
politics. The economic and political perspectives may not be ignored given the 
conditions on which the international financial markets have been established 
and developed to; even though economics and politics are not the core of the 
study.  
In the study suitable theories of Law and Economics and principles of 
Regulation Theories will be assessed in a critical perspective. The study 
examines possible ways to approach the international financial regulation, as 
if: 
1. Binding treaties which the undersigned parties shall ratify and 
implement (direct and complete harmonization of legislation). 
2. Adapting the same basic legislative principles and legal 
interpretation practices among jurisdictions (harmonization through 
certain principles; e.g. IOSCO).  
3. Soft law orientated cooperative approach: Convergence between 
regulatory and supervisory entities without agreeing on binding 
legislation (as measures: for example information sharing agreements, 
substituted compliance and ways of mutual recognition). 
4. Let the market practices and participants determine “best possible” 
compliance measures and standardized contractual clauses etc. 
                                                     
19 IOSCO 2010, p.3. 
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(laizzes faire –approach or self-regulation by market participants e.g. 
Basel Committee). 
5. Some sort of combination from Sections 1-4. 
At first, in the Thesis, it is in place to picture contemporary nature of the dealt 
phenomenon: A) generically operational environment of global economy and 
B) particularly of international financial markets (Section 2). Secondly it is 
worthwhile to be asked why a phenomenon such as financial markets and 
transactions of financial products should be even regulated with detailed and 
additional rules than other traded goods, commodities and services. And why 
there should be taken an additional international aspect to the scrutiny of the 
regulation on financial markets. These issues are dealt in light of appropriate 
theories on Law and Economics and Regulation Theories. This (Section 3) 
shall contribute the major theoretical part of the study.  
Then thirdly it is observed the historical and recent actual development of the 
regulatory landscape; A) generally at the globe and B) especially in EU and 
U.S. (Section 4). The specific touch shall concentrate on the authorities’ 
jurisdiction, ability and willingness to participate on international regulatory / 
supervisory cooperation. Special scrutiny will be placed to illustrate EU’s 
authorities mandate on international cooperation as well as Union’s track 
record to combine 28 sovereign jurisdictions under one juridical umbrella. On 
Section 5 the recent flaws of international financial markets are briefly 
discussed. 
Finally (Sections 5, 6 and 7) I’ll try to frame a picture, in principle, of possible 
regulatory strategies for the international financial markets in relation to 
relevant theories and reality. The study shall examine the scope of the 
obstacles, challenges and possibilities that regulatory environment might 
endure and / or achieve in the coming years. A concrete case example is also 
provided and briefly analysed in light of appropriate theoretical aspects and 
legal-eco-political reality. Major goal for the study is to contemplate and 
illustrate which aspects and perspective are essential for further, more in 
depth, scrutiny on the topic.  
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In order to define the subject of the study on mainly juridical basis some 
political and economic terms, views and presumptions, which have an 
influence on the topic, have been taken into legal context straightforwardly 
without debating about their nature comprehensively by methods of their 
‘home sciences’. Therefore it can be argued that these terms and 
presumptions are disputable in political sciences and in economics. 
Nevertheless to simplify the study some of these perspectives have had to be 
left out of discussion in this context all though their existence is recognized and 
they will be covered in the study to some extent. 
One purpose of this study will be to serve as a base for forthcoming 
assessments. Therefore it shall be illustrated and framed the core juridical 
questions pertaining to future developments.  
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2 The nature and development of international financial markets 
 
2.1 A Review to history of globalisation and defining the current globalized 
economic operational environment 
 
2.1.1 History review 
Intensifying internationality on finance as well as on every other aspect of 
human lives can be seen as part of the globalisation process. The term 
globalisation has dominated the past decades of debate in social sciences, 
economics and it has reached its effect to legal discussions also. Some might 
imagine that globalisation as a phenomenon was a newly discovered topic due 
to the vigorous debate it has aroused in recent years. Though, that is not the 
case. It can be seen as a centuries lasting process or at least a fluctuating 
phenomenon which has existed on varying depth from the 15th century. 
Some academics even state the ‘origins’ of the history of globalisation to the 
days of Alexander the Great (325 BCE) when link among overland routes 
between the Mediterranean, Persia, India, and Central Asia was established.20 
Many scholars, as Financial Times’ Economic journalist Martin Wolf, argue that 
it can be said ‘real globalisation’ have begun with the voyages of European 
discovery of the 15th and 16th centuries. In the last decade of the 15th 
century, Christopher Columbus reached the Americas and the Portuguese 
entered the Indian Ocean. Since then peoples that had previously been 
isolated have become increasingly closely interconnected. This has been true 
of relations among the civilisations of the Eurasian land-mass. It has been still 
truer of relations between Eurasia and the hitherto largely - or entirely - 
isolated continents of Africa, the Americas and Australasia. Humanity had 
become aware both of itself and of the globe, as a whole. 21,22 
It was the era before the First World War (mainly 19th century), when world 
was experiencing economically flourishing era of globalisation. Then trade 
barriers and a change on international political situation led to a decline in the 
                                                     
20 History of Globalisation. 
21 Wolf 2004. 
22 The Economist, on 23 September 2013. 
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volume of internationality during the early decades of 20th century. This 
situation lasted until after the Second World War the surge on international 
trade was finally picking pace.23 
The fluctuations on the level of interconnection on international trade have 
affected to the international finance. At times capital markets have been 
significantly open and converged; at times protectionism has shaken the 
operational environment. Mainly the levels of openness on trade and finance 
have gone together. 
When contemplating the nature and history of international finance, one 
notable classic, which provides great deal of perspective to the topic, is 
Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crashes. The book was first published on 
1978 and the latest revised version on 2005. The main credit for the work is 
that Kindleberger has been able to detect certain functions and errors that 
keep repeating on financial markets. Kindleberger’s touch to the issue is crisis 
orientated. Therefore it functions arguable well as a side material in studying 
the nature of international financial regulation; given that it may very well be 
argued the one core purpose of regulation is preventing crisis and systemic 
risks. Kindleberger’s findings could be summoned that there can be found a 
standard pattern in which speculative bubbles are caused by new, unusually 
profitable investment products. Often, products reflect movements toward 
globalisation as new markets or technologies appear that can be exploited by 
a given country or by an economic sector in several countries.24 
Internationality and / or globalism in economic activity as well as in finance has 
been present for centuries and the level of it has varied; that is also the case of 
agreements, rules and regulation stipulating the trade and finance. The 
summary on the respect of history on globalisation of regulation shall be 
concluded on Section 4. 
 
                                                     
23 Trade Survey 2002, p.2. 
24 Kindleberger 2005. 
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2.1.2 The current global economic operational environment 
It is in place to define current global economic environment in order to be able 
to contemplate the globalisation and / or internationality of regulation i.e. 
international regulation for financial markets. To do so, the social sciences 
need to be used, as an adjutant, in order to understand the basics of economic 
operational environment from which arises the need for possible international 
financial regulation. 
Social science, i.e. sociology, shall be used to define globalisation and to 
connect the socio-economic and political debate to juridical argumentation on 
regulation. Globalisation can be defined as the “intensification of economic, 
political, social, and cultural relations across borders”25. In this sense 
description involves more than the geographical extension of a range of 
phenomena and issues. What comes to globalisation of economy, in juridical 
sense, as Drahos and Braithwaite determine it, it has always at least three (3) 
distinct processes: i) the globalisation of firms, ii) the globalisation of markets, 
iii) the globalisation of regulation26. 
In generally the argumentation can be interpreted in a way that incrementally 
evolved operational landscape has diminished the previous legal power and 
ability of sovereign nations. Therefore it can be seen worthwhile to 
contemplate certain reasonable possibilities in order to fit the regulatory 
framework to correspond the contemporary reality. In this study this issue is 
approach from the perspective of regulatory cooperation between the 
supervisory authorities. But there are and has been more idealistic and 
ambitious approaches to confront the changed operational environment. 
One approach to control the distinct aspects of complex globalisation process 
has been idealistic prescription of World Government.27 Though, it can be 
concluded that given the complexity of current political climate on the globe, 
this goal is challenging to achieve. Or as Drahos and Braithwaite put it; the 
World Government ”as a solution to the globalisation of markets and regulation 
                                                     
25 Holm 1995, p.1.  
26 Drahos 2001, p. 103. 
27 Habermas 1996, p. 456. 
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might be empirically shown to be utopian in the face of the capacity of some 
states with mighty treasuries and armies to defend their sovereign powers”28.  
Therefore some other ‘moderate’ solutions might be in place to be sought. This 
study endeavours answering that question, at least, to some extent. On the 
next Section the internationality of contemporary financial markets shall be 
contemplated with concrete examples and measurements. 
  
2.2 How international the contemporary financial markets are? 
It is in place to describe the structure and functions of contemporary 
international financial markets before it shall be considered how to regulate the 
mentioned phenomenon, in case regulation is needed. Given the definitions for 
international financial transactions on Section 1.1., it can be easily concluded, 
in layman’s terms, that we are truly living in a world where the financial 
products are traded cross-border, the actors of financial markets operate in 
multi-jurisdictional landscape and the market sentiment spreads around the 
globe rapidly. But what is the factual evidence behind this assumption and how 
international or global financial markets truly are? 
Defining and measuring the level of globalization on financial markets is 
challenging by absolute numbers and comprehensively. The next paragraphs 
will illustrate certain tools to measure the level of internationality and 
interconnection between markets with suitable scales including few examples. 
Following examples can be contemplated in correspondence with the Private 
International Law; i.e. do these examples prove that multijurisdictional 
questions are increasing on international financial markets? 
1. Price correlation between the markets: The higher the correlations in 
rates of returns on similar assets across countries, arguably the more 
integrated the markets.29 After the Second World War the price 
                                                     
28 Drahos 2001, p. 107. 
29 Scott 2012, p. 16. 
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correlation between all financial markets around the world has steadily 
and significantly increased.30  
2. Quantitative approaches: 
i) For example looking the portfolio diversification in light of 
‘home bias’ effect which illustrate how eagerly the investors 
prefer domestic investment versus foreign. From 2001 to 2008 
‘home bias’ effect has decreased from 78 per cent to 66 per 
cent among US investors.31 
ii) More drastic numbers can be found when looking the cross-
border trading by foreign investors in the U.S. The sum of 
transactions in long-term securities (stocks and bonds), in the 
U.S. between foreign investors and residents from 1977 
through 2003 rose significantly. Over that period, the ratio of 
these transactions to GDP increased from 5.76% to 344.18%, 
or by a factor of 60.32 
iii) The portion of foreign companies in the largest stock market 
in the world, New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), was 2.12% 
of total amount of listed companies in 1975 and 5.14% in 
1990.33 In 2007 before the recent financial crisis the same 
portion was already 16.9%.34 In terms of market capitalization 
the portion of foreign companies was more significant already 
in 2005: the foreign companies had remarkable 37% of the 
NYSE’s total market capitalization at that time.35 
3. Contagion effect, no matter where and why it occurs, provides an 
argument that financial markets are profoundly connected and 
international. 
                                                     
30 Goetzmann 2001, Figure 3 p.45. and Aslanidis 2008, Table 4 p. 28. 
31 Coeurdacier 2011. 
32 Stulz 2005, pp. 7-8. 
33 Coffee 2002. 
34 Tafara 2007, p. 34. 
35 Public letter 2006. 
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i) On September 2008 when a giant financial service company 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“Lehman”) filed for bankruptcy 
in US, the securities worldwide plunged. In Europe, FTSE 
index in London declined 3.92 percent while the Paris CAC 40 
was down 3.78 percent. It was the worst day for the index 
since the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001.36 
ii) In the beginning of 2014 the turbulence with no significant 
straightforward connection between the countries hit the 
emerging markets. Even though many financial institutions 
around the globe are exposed to the risks of these nations, 
there is no clear straightforward link between the countries but 
the fact their societies progress as “emerging market nation”, 
economically and politically, is more or less at the same phase. 
The turbulence that commenced by freefall of Argentinean 
peso has affected to the currencies of Brazil, Chile, Turkey, 
South-Africa, Russia and even China.37 Through a decline of 
Russian rouble it has already impacted to Finnish export 
industry.38  
Given the aforementioned details, financial markets can be considered 
international and interconnected in various ways. It can also be seen, in light of 
aforementioned examples, that cross-border financial transactions are 
completed increasingly. This raises many questions in multijurisdictional, 
Private International Law, perspective: which authorities and or tribunals are 
competent to rule over the transactions, which laws to apply and how the 
resolutions are enforceable. Therefore in the contemporary financial markets 
the question over international regulatory approach can be seen increasingly 
present.39 
The regional touch of this study focuses on transactions and possible 
cooperation between U.S. and EU in particular. This approach is supported by 
                                                     
36 CNN Lehman on 15 September 2008. 
37 FT 31 January 2014. 
38 Kauppalehti 31 January 2014. 
39 Please see the definition on Private International Law on Section 1.1. 
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the fact that transatlantic markets still have over 50% stock market 
capitalisation on the globe and the transatlantic share in global stock trading 
covers approximately 70%.40 
 
2.3 So what? Is there any connection to ‘Main Street’41? 
On the above section it has been argued that there is a deepening 
interconnection between different regional financial markets and therefore it 
may be concluded that financial markets are international and / or global, at 
least to some extent. Thus, the conclusion can be followed with an argument 
that there are multi-jurisdictional elements and cross-border activity on the 
financial markets. It can also be seen that corporations which participate to 
financial markets in order to seek funding are exposed to these unpredictable 
contagion effects. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, is there any real 
connection to the ‘main street’ and to the lives of millions of human around the 
globe or is this talk about integrated financial markets just an academic 
discussion which has a real impact only to big global corporations and players 
on the financial markets? In other words, how significant issue we are 
assessing in relation to ordinary citizens, their lives and legal protection? 
Given the determinations on importance of foreign exchange markets on the 
previous sections, it could be argued that all humans who use currencies, 
which are part of foreign exchange markets, are part of the financial markets. 
Therefore almost every individual around the globe living in somewhat humane 
conditions is liable to the influence of financial markets in some scope. The 
analogy might be close to truth; though some further argumentation is in need 
to support it. The main issue revolves around the question how deeply affected 
ordinary citizens are to financial market fluctuations and what this could mean 
for future regulatory approach? 
The debate among academics whether macroeconomics and financial markets 
correlate has, and still is, a continuous topic. Macroeconomic views many 
                                                     
40 AmCham 2012, p. 17. 
41 Main Street is a term used widely in US to symbolize normal citizens and households and to illustrate 
the “imaginary” difference, which can be argued does not exist, between “financial markets” and “real 
economy”. The term is an opposite of “Wall Street” which symbolizes the financial markets. 
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times highlight that there is ‘something wacky with stocks’ or ‘stocks are driven 
by fads and fashions disconnected from the real economy’. On the contrast 
financers may argue that ‘something is desperately wrong with most 
macroeconomic models’ and ‘asset markets are the mechanism that does all 
this equating’ instead of created theories and models.42 These two 
distinguishing features can be synchronised to help and explain each other; 
they do not need to rule out other approach. Both real economy and financial 
economy (or financial markets and macroeconomics) are in a linkage, for 
example by the influence of financial conditions of firms and households on 
consumption and investment, as it is pictured in an understandable way by 
Konstantinos Tsatsaronis on a study of Bank of International Settlement’s 
(“BIS”).43 
The ongoing debate among economic / finance scholars is how tight this 
connection is and how it should be measured. Classic example is Deutsche 
Bundesbank’s illustration that a 100 euro decline in the value of stock holdings 
decreases the private consumption in Germany by 1 to 2 euros44. Studies 
show that consumer confidence and stock markets correlate; as does the 
private consumption with the markets. Financial market fluctuations and 
developments have some, but weak, straightforward reflection to Gross 
Domestic Product (“GDP”) growth, even though the links are debatable on 
economic studies. Some argue that due to the reason that securities markets 
always predict the future the better measurement would be how GDP follows 
the securities indices afterwards. This evaluation provides a slightly stronger 
link between the financial markets and GDP development.45 
An important manifestation of the importance and interconnection of 
international financial markets for individuals might be following examples on 
recent developments and incidents in the world of finance. 
Lehman’s collapse on September 2008 finally burst the looming bubble of US 
mortgage markets. It can be simplified that seeds of the crisis were planted on 
                                                     
42 Cochrane 2005, pp. 2-4. 
43 BIS Paper, pp. 1-4. 
44 Bundesbank 2003, p. 40. 
45 Stock Markets vs. GDP 2012, p. 3. 
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the ‘main street’ by reckless lending practices, delivered to financial system by 
securitisation and finally the effects were once again returned to the real 
economy when ‘sub-primes’ started falter and the stagnation of finance led to 
drying up the investments which resulted as unemployment. Given the 
globalised markets of securitised debt (mortgages), the phenomenon shocked, 
at least, the whole semi-developed world.46 
Other example is the hedge fund giant Bernie Madoff who led the multibillion 
dollar Ponzi-scheme, in which participated many of the wealthiest people on 
earth. But also the ‘regular payroll earners’ were scammed to trust their 
savings on the hands of Madoff.47 The savers were convinced that through 
Madoff’s brilliance they could participate directly to financial markets with low 
risk and high reward; a mind-set that never can be true. Madoff-case is one 
example of new direct ways how ‘regular payroll earners’ have been seeking 
involvement on the financial markets. 
One additional example illustrates how the ‘main street’ itself is even more 
intensively participating to Financial Markets. The changes in public pension 
policies have driven the regular households to save directly or indirectly on 
financial markets. This has led to a greater retail participation in capital 
markets on both sides of the Atlantic.48 The medium wage earners have been 
more consent that they might have to secure their retirement days by 
themselves; also the awakening that private social welfare programmes might 
be needed has swept the European consumer landscape. As European 
Commission noted on 2005, the issue need to be dealt by improving financial 
literacy programmes in order to safeguard that investors participating to the 
financial markets would be more aware of their risk positions, “as the public 
sector gradually withdraws from financing some aspects of social systems, 
there is a need for increased awareness and direct involvement of citizens in 
financial issues”49. 
                                                     
46 Scott 2012, pp. 31-38. 
47 Madoff Victims, BBC on 12 March 2009. 
48 Alexander 2007, p. 323. 
49 EC 2005, p.7. 
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It is worthwhile to mention that the households’ willingness to participate to the 
financial markets is not only driven by the insecurity of pension and welfare 
policies. I tend to argue that globalised information era itself increases the 
enthusiasm to participate on financial markets. It might simply be due to the 
fact that investing seems easier and less burdensome than before; also 
information about finance is available from various sources around the clock. 
When these factors are combined to basic human urge to improve living 
conditions, we have a bubbling financial cocktail. To put it bluntly, a Finnish 
grocery store cashier can easily generate that much extra savings per month 
that he / she is able to buy a piece of Brazil’s growth through various mutual 
funds. Therefore it is reasonable once again to remind about the question what 
challenges this creates for regulators? 
At this point it is worth to mention the old saying that when “a taxi driver 
advises you to buy stocks to make a quick buck, run like the wind in the 
opposite direction and sell, as valuations are likely in bubble territory”.50 This 
old, slightly elitist, view may not apply straightforwardly to modern world put it 
has some notable value at least on the perspective of future challenges of 
regulation. 
How judicial systems and regulation should confront the reality where there are 
increasing numbers of investors with different professional capabilities? Should 
it be in place to initiate totally different regulatory approaches towards different 
investor classes; should there be more investor classes created? Of course 
the securities regulation already recognises widely the distinction of non-
professional and professional investors; their levels of protection vary,51 but is 
this enough and suitable level of regulation? Or should professional investors 
also be part of governmental paternalism, to some extent, given latest financial 
crisis and criticism towards the concept of ‘reasonable investor’ from 
behavioural economics scholars52? 
All together the development which has led to increasing retail participation on 
the financial markets can be seen as a progressive way to promote ‘people’s 
                                                     
50 Marketwatch 2012. 
51 Example from EU: CESR/10-1040. 
52 Black 2012, p. 12. 
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capitalism’ that should create more liquidity on the markets which again should 
promote innovations, investments, growth and better opportunities for humans 
to improve their living conditions. To stop the idealism at this point, it is 
worthwhile to mention widening participation (direct and indirect) on the 
financial markets by non-professional investors creates more entry points for 
crisis into the system and arguable might facilitate fraud possibilities. Also the 
increase on liquidity has a tendency to create bubbles. All together this 
emphasizes the importance of appropriate regulation and efficient supervision 
that corresponds to the current reality of financial world; not only for investor 
protection, efficiency and transparency but also in order to prevent frauds on 
the system.  
It can be concluded, the connection between these concepts, financial markets 
and real economy, is getting seriously profounder than before. Thus, the 
terminological separation of ‘Wall-Street’ and ‘Main Street’ may not apply 
anymore to the reality of contemporary world. Also it can be concluded, that 
not only the financial markets itself are interconnected but also the financial 
markets have some straight link to macroeconomics and to the daily lives of 
regular citizens around the globe. 
In modern democracies regulation should always have its legitimacy among 
citizens, at least to some extent. Even though this is well-known fact that 
arguable almost everyone with juridical education supports; the legitimacy 
question is quite often disregarded when it comes to arguing about proper 
financial regulation. For example I tend to argue that in the field of securities 
law fundamental right orientated weighing has not gained ground. It could be 
stated that Securities Law scholars seem to be mainly concentrated on 
practical implications when arguing whether certain regulation is appropriate or 
not. The legitimacy of the regulation and fundamental right orientated 
approach should not be disregarded from the debate. More diverse 
perspectives could provide arguments to just regulation but also they might 
deliver some practical insight for efficiency debate given the fact that retail 
participation on financial markets is increasing. In this study legitimacy and 
fundamental rights implications are dealt on Sections 3, 6 and 7. 
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3 Regulation needed? In case answering yes; why and how? Relevant applicable 
theoretical perspectives and reality on international financial regulation 
 
3.1 Financial markets and transactions as targets of regulation 
 
3.1.1 General goals and drivers for regulation of economic activity 
Human activity and interaction are based on certain rules. Rules might be tacit 
agreements constituted by practice without noticing their existence as well as 
rules can be well planned and agreed in writing. Rules may be binding in 
nature or they might appear as guidelines. Rules can be socially and culturally 
structured and supervised by peers. Rules may very well be enacted explicitly 
by legislation, passed in force by other means of public authorities in 
accordance with their jurisdiction or rules can be created by precedents of the 
courts. Especially the aforementioned ‘officially created rules’ are normally 
(should be) well enforceable and also sometimes supervised by certain official 
authority. 
Mature legal systems have general legislation which covers economic 
transactions between individuals (legal and natural persons). Legal 
Transactions Act, Commercial Code etc. determine the juridical basis for 
commercial transactions among individuals. Nevertheless legal systems have 
special regulation to control various activities when it has considered that the 
nature of certain activity needs detailed rules. This is the case with financial 
markets and transactions also. As defined in Section 2 financial markets affect 
basically all humans and their basic ability to be economic individual actors in 
their daily lives. The legislators seem to have considered that, given the 
importance of the phenomenon, financial markets need to be controlled by 
special authorities and with detailed regulation. Further on it will be asked why. 
In this study there is no intention to determine strict borderlines between 
private law and public law. Neither there is any intention to fit certain 
phenomenon into explicit branch of law. It may very well be expressed financial 
markets and transactions have at least a linkage to several branches of 
Property Law as well as Administrative Law and Criminal Law. To put it bluntly, 
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financial transactions could be characterised as private contracts that are 
mainly executed on regulated and supervised market places. In this Thesis a 
phenomenon is intended to be put under assessment as it exists across 
branches of law. It can be stated that financial markets and transactions are 
mostly economic phenomenon that has its connection to behavioural sciences 
and political reality. Therefore it is reasonable to contemplate the rules and 
regulations of financial markets in accordance with relevant theories on 
regulation of economic activity; without forgetting the political and group 
dynamic aspects of the phenomenon.  
Traditionally laws, decrees and rules have been seen as reflections of public 
interest. In a democratic society a change in public opinion should be 
channelled to an amendment on provisions stipulating the matter in question. 
In regulation of the economic activity it is often stated that certain market 
failures need to be corrected and / or the public interest and vulnerable market 
participants needs to be protected.53 This control action of the authorities is 
also referred as public intervention. Traditional regulatory theory, or the public 
interest theory, has often stated that authorities should react if the public 
demands for changes in order to correct inefficient or unjust practices for 
example in the financial markets54. This approach stems from the idea that 
regulation is to be justified from the public interest and regulators are to do 
good for the public. 
In Law and Economics, which is a suitable theoretical framework to confront 
the problems and possibilities of regulation on financial transactions, it has 
constructed a Public Choice Theory that critically assesses regulatory 
interventions and their success. The theory goes even beyond by arguing that 
public officials would not (always) promote public good but the interest of their 
personal welfare or benefits of particular authority or agency or branch of 
business that they supposed to be regulating.55 This feature is also defined as 
Agency Capture which means that the regulator itself is actual part of the 
industry (an agent for it) that it regulates and therefore in the end regulator is 
                                                     
53 Määttä 2006, p. 21. 
54 Posner 1974, p. 335. 
55 Gwartney 1988, p. 7. 
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‘doomed’ to support and promote the interest of particular branch of 
business.56 It has also been noted that even though politicians or regulators 
would not be agents for interest groups behind them, these powerful interest 
groups often tend to control available public information and opinion formation 
of the topics.57 This sort of argumentation is often used to promote SROs and 
their ability to determined suitable practices for particular branch of business. 
Altogether this makes the authorities work to deliver appropriate regulation on 
financial markets challenging; given the fact that substantial economic interest 
are in play and the branch of business has a significant interest groups that 
possess a great deal of lobbying power and control on information.  
 
3.1.2 Approaches to regulation of financial markets and transactions 
As mentioned above there are certain policy areas on regulation of economic 
activities in which legislators seem to have had an interest to specific 
intervention i.e. general rules of commercial transactions have not been seen 
sufficient. But what are the common arguments among scholars or regulators 
how they justify and argue the intervention by regulation on financial markets? 
In U.S. the basic rationale to justify the regulation on securities markets is 
based on information asymmetries. It could be concluded that, traditionally in 
U.S., securing the quantity and quality of available information has basically 
considered sufficient argument and also goal for regulation.58 In EU, if we 
contemplate the preambles of recent legislative initiatives (directives and 
regulation), it seems that the rationale for regulation is justified by 
straightforward reference to the public interest. Of course it may very well be 
argued that in U.S. the public interest is covered by providing sufficient amount 
of information for the markets in general and that the main rationale behind 
disclosure requirements is executing the public interest in practice. Especially, 
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57 Macey 1988, pp.1275-1280. 
58 Scott 2012, pp. 87–91. 
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taking notice the introduction of SEC and its rationale of existence, provided on 
agency’s web page59. 
It might be concluded, given the legislators’ agenda and comments of scholars 
stated above, that direct or indirect protection and fulfilment of the public 
interest seem to be the reasons behind regulation on financial markets even 
though this goal can be considered challenging to satisfy. As expressed on 
Sections 1-2 of this study, given the importance of financial markets for 
societies as well as for individuals and deepening connection between ‘main 
street’ and ‘wall street’, legislators can be seen to have an interest on 
facilitating the effective capital formation with the appropriate control of 
systemic risk and investor protection. 
Well established goals for sound financial regulation could be the main 
principles of IOSCO60. The following core questions to be asked for could be 
simplified as: How these goals can be measured and enhanced for? Or how 
activities between the parties of certain financial transaction should be 
interpreted appropriately in legal weighting, given the fact that in reality the 
aforementioned IOSCO principles might and will collide? It is not an oxymoron 
to say that both principles can be improved in tandem, but it is reasonable to 
note that in reality these goals will collide at times. 
Interesting perspectives for controlling the free markets can also be found from 
Finnish legal literature. Pekka Timonen has concluded that occasion where 
completely unregulated markets would function in a satisfactory way is rare. 
Timonen also notes that the main focus should not be in a question to regulate 
or not; but how to regulate.61 For example in Finland there has been a Public 
Stock Exchange since 1912 but the Securities Laws were established in the 
late 1980’. So did Finnish Stock Exchange function without regulation almost 
90 years? The Rules of the Stock Exchange were the detailed regulation 
framework which covered the transactions on Finnish securities markets62. 
This is a notable example how regulation and / or rules can be constructed by 
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60 Please see Section 1.3. 
61 Timonen 1997, p.357. 
62 Rudanko 1998, pp. 6-7. 
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various other means than with mandatory legislation. Though, the rationale 
behind the regulation might remain same and it might be reasonable to ask is 
self-regulation really enough for contemporary financial markets in mature 
legal systems. 
 
3.2 Principles of theories on law and economics in relation to financial markets 
regulation 
 
3.2.1 Framing of questions in traditional Law and Economics 
The core theoretical or philosophical questions to be asked for could be 
simplified as: How private economic activity should be regulated with just, 
efficient and effective manner? How these issues can be measured and 
enhanced for? Or how economic activity between the parties of certain 
transaction should be interpreted appropriately in legal weighing? 
Law and Economics is a multifaceted research tendency that studies e.g. how 
economic analyses can be utilised in interpreting the law. Also the interest can 
be focused how appropriate (just, effective and efficient) regulation is or how 
economic actors can be better regulated in order to achieve best possible 
outcome for example in a society as a whole. This tendency is often referred 
as Regulation Theory. Law and Economics can also be used to evaluate and 
analyse the reactions of independent entities to legislation (both natural and 
legal persons); e.g. ‘effect analyses’ can be used to measure how certain tax 
increase effects on individuals’ behaviour.63 
Law and Economics can be divided and systemised in various ways. Common 
distinction is A) positive and B) normative Law and Economics. In positive Law 
and Economics it is studied if certain legal state is in accord with economic 
realities. Positive approach analyses the effects legislation has on behaviour. 
In normative Law and Economics it is analysed how the legal state should be, 
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in order to promote policy aims. One core field on Law and Economics is 
regulation theory, which has its normative and positive sides.64 
Regulation theory can serve the legislator by concentrating on the study of 
appropriate regulation. The focus can be on legal state that is in force and its 
appropriateness (de lege lata) or the perspective might include aims to 
reconstruct the legal state (de lege ferenda).65 
Normative regulation theory, in Law and Economics, can also be seen as 
study of steering mechanisms or regulation options that would serve the best 
in achieving certain socio-political goal. It can be also contemplated if 
particular regulation is needed or not. In positive regulation theory’s approach 
it is analysed legislator’s choices; whether the legislator’s decision making has 
been affected by lobbying groups and the interests’ of officials.66 
In this study there has not been adapted any particular doctrine and / or 
approach. The goal is to combine different theoretical possibilities to practical 
reality as suitable. In studying the regulation and regulatory cooperation on 
international financial markets current legal state is to be evaluated and 
possible useful proposals are scrutinized in the light of IOSCO principles67 i) 
protecting investors, ii) Ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and 
transparent, iii) reducing systemic risk; by the mechanisms of suitable theories 
(and practice). 
The goal of the study is to illustrate the current legal state on international 
mandate of regulatory / supervisory entities; and how their mandates could be 
applied, in the perspective of relevant theories on Law and Economics, to 
fortify and improve the fulfilment of aforementioned IOSCO principles in 
international financial markets, in particularly on transatlantic markets. It can 
be concluded that one interesting perspective for the study is the internal 
conflict of the IOSCO principles. The conflict between efficiency and fairness 
has been contemplated on the field of Law and Economics since decades.68 It 
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has become increasingly interesting topic on recent years given the financial 
turmoil and its wide spread effects. 
Efficiency itself as term is a continuous topic of debate in Law and Economics. 
So called pareto-efficiency is a form of efficiency analyses where wealth 
creation for some is justified in case it does not affect negatively to others 
wealth status and / or welfare. In Kaldor-Hicks efficiency wealth maximising 
can be justified even if the result affects negatively for some in case there is a 
possibility to compensate these effects (i.e. overall welfare increases). 
In financial regulation it is very hard to imagine a situation where certain rule 
could serve the benefits of all market participants. Therefore it should be more 
suitable to look for balancing the cost effects and search for less damaging 
solution for non-beneficiary market participants. Therefore Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency might seem more realistic and reasonable efficiency approach for 
financial market regulation. Though, it is very well debateable if efficiency is 
the best measurement of good regulation. As mentioned above the constant 
discussion concerning the relation of efficiency and equitability is arising at the 
moment. Therefore I am trying to emphasise the multifaceted character of 
financial regulation. Political reality and its aspects to regulation are to be 
taking under consideration as well as fundamental right orientated approach. 
 
3.2.2 Useful ideas from the concept of ‘New Property Law’ and other 
additional theoretical perspectives 
‘Weighting of Fundamental Rights’, as a concept, could be characterised as a 
major theme on legal debate, at least in Europe, for past decades. Final phase 
of the essential process was adoption, entry into force on 2009, of the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as a part of the Union treaties. As of its entry 
into force Union entities and Union law interpretation may not disregard 
weighting of fundamental rights69. 
In legal theory it is a well-established principle that fundamental rights are on 
the higher level on the hierarchy of legal sources than regular legislation. 
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Fundamental rights can be seen in a horizontal perspective affecting in 
relationships between individuals or in a vertical dimension between individual 
and public authority. It is typical for fundamental rights that in practice they 
collide and therefore the legal interpreter needs to execute weighting between 
these fundamental rights in resolving factual situations.  
Property Law has not been the most eager adapter of fundamental right based 
interpretations. Under the concept of ‘New Property Law’ there has been 
systemised a comprehensive ‘tool box’ to put use the fundamental right 
orientated perspective on interpreting the factual situations as comprehensive 
manner. In the concept of New Property Law wealth / property has been 
systemised as comprehensive manner as a legal triangle of proprietary right, 
contract and indemnity.70 In this sense individual cases should be dealt as a 
whole, not in light of certain juridical segment.  
Fundamental right positive interpretation on law has fortified the ‘fundamental 
right sensitive’ norms in Property Law71. This basically means that in particular 
transaction and / or situation different interest quarters have their position 
covered by one or several competing fundamental rights. Each individual case 
should be sensitively contemplated in relation to the principle of 
proportionality.72 
The core of each fundamental right should be evaluated and protected. When 
weighting the fundamental right positions of each party certain principles as 
precautionary, transparency and fiduciary protection should be applied73. In the 
perspective of financial markets especially the principle of transparency is 
applicable. Transparency can be seen as a key principle to picture and solve 
problems pertaining to relation of investor protection and efficient capital 
formation.74 
Also it is suitable, in perspective of financial transactions, to note that at times 
weighting need to be made in relation to parties’ autonomy of contract and 
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73 Ibid. 
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other fundamental rights protected by society. This collision might occur for 
example when certain party has contractually limited its individual rights or in 
consent posed itself under considerable risks.75 
It is reasonable to argue that fundamental rights orientated approach should 
be applied both horizontally and vertically. Therefore fundamental rights 
orientated approach to Property Law has perspectives to provide for 
international regulatory cooperation pertaining to the question how to treat 
regulated entities. Especially it can be used to determine which means and 
ends could be valued the most in the agenda while authorities are 
contemplating forms to execute cooperation. 
In this perspective it should also be noted that behavioural economics have 
criticised the concept of rational / reasonable investor which has been a clear 
tendency in securities law76. This perspective also emphasises the need to 
more comprehensive theoretical thinking ‘outside the box’ when contemplating 
the legal nature of financial transactions and their regulation. Fundamental 
rights orientated approach could be one suitable solution in respect of 
balancing between the appropriate protection of investors and effective capital 
formation. Behavioural economics, agency capture and group behaviour 
theories could also be used to explore the problematic position of regulatory / 
supervisory entities when they are reaching for liaison on cross-border relation. 
As noted by Olsson, a group theories’ scholar, all the groups have a tendency 
to only maximize their success.77 It should be assessed the possibilities how 
regulatory organisations operating on different jurisdictions could win this 
superstition and work genuinely together in juridical cooperation for long term 
view; not only to promote their self-interest goals on short term.  
Also it is legitimate to question the illusion of reasonable gatekeepers that 
financial system heavily relies on, for example Credit Rating Agencies (“CRA”). 
As stated by Coffee, the recent financial crisis has illustrated numerous flaws 
in this respect78. Given the aforementioned paragraphs, a question can be 
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raised that disregarding the investor classes (professional / non-professional) 
should all investors and gatekeepers need government paternalism to some 
extent? The problem revolves around the efficiency debate. If paternalism is to 
be increased by justifying it in terms of investor protection and control of the 
gatekeepers, there is a great doubt that the efficient capital formation is to be 
hindered. This again will have an effect to consumers when the cost of 
regulation shall be transferred to the prices of financial services. One 
perspective is to search balance between the necessary protection and the 
harmful cost effects that protective stipulations might create. Other suitable 
aspect might be to execute weighting between competing fundamental rights, 
i.e. protection of property and freedom of trade. 
Fundamental right orientated approach might be evaded or at least not warmly 
welcomed by e.g. certain traditional scholars of securities laws. Nevertheless 
fundamental rights perspective delivers not only legitimacy to legal system of 
economic relations but also additional useful ‘solution power’ to Property Law 
and to financial regulation. If used properly, it could deliver efficiency in Kaldor-
Hicks perspective. As mentioned before, the situation in which the wealth 
increase (benefits) of all participants could be promoted through regulation is 
quite unrealistic on financial markets regulation. Therefore the concept of New 
Property Law might deliver some efficiency implications to particular 
judgement situations in order to find ‘less damaging solution as a whole’. This 
perspective suits to the idea on Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  
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PART II TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON PROBLEMS AND 
POSSIBILITIES OF REGULATORY COOPERATION 
4 Developments on financial regulation and regulatory entities’ jurisdiction – 
particularly on EU and U.S. 
 
4.1 Historical review to ‘globalisation of financial regulation’ 
Throughout ancient times powerful city-states and / or regions, after gaining 
their stance on power or their autonomy, were eager to emit their proper 
currency.79 Therefore monetary control can be seen as a mean of power since 
the early stage of civilisations. Monetary harmonisation and monetary unions 
were also common. The Persian and Roman Empires, for example, tried to 
gain control over coinage80. Therefore right to coin became a hallmark of 
sovereign power. The power over coinage was used as a mean to political 
supremacy81. This could be compared to nowadays power of central banks to 
determine the value of money, inflation and liquidity. 
Financial Regulation can be divided to various ‘regimes’, e.g.: monetary, 
banking, securities and insurance regulation (the aforementioned classification 
adapts actually more or less to the newly established supervisory structure in 
EU). Historically these regulation ‘regimes’ have globalised on different 
degrees. On ancient times as well as on the early days of the 20th century the 
main concern of national states on global financial regulation was concentrated 
around the international monetary system due to the reason that sovereign 
states had an interest to equilibrate the imbalances of payments between 
states. Monetary union agreements were completed among independent city 
republics of Greece already on the fifth century. The main goals for such 
settlements were reciprocal trade interests. 82 
That argument does not sound so far-fetched on nowadays terms either. When 
one thinks about the European Single markets and European Monetary Union 
(“EMU”); the similar arguments prevail. As it goes on bilateral and multilateral 
trade negotiations that are taken place at the moment. Also the discussions 
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concerning cooperation and convergence on international financial regulation 
stem from the corresponding idea: reciprocal actions are needed to secure the 
interests of a many on changed operational environment. 
After the Second World War in Bretton Woods the modern basis for 
convergence on financial regulation was created. Even though the cooperation 
was mainly focused on monetary issues and did not include other ideas of 
regulatory convergence nor did the liaison go to lengths and depths some 
were picturing. As British representative economist John Maynard Keynes 
wrote to the UK’s Chancellor after the meeting “Fund [IMF] can scarcely be, at 
any rate in the early years, the nucleus of a super-central bank, such as we 
hoped”83. 
When studying the history of globalisation of regulation on financial markets, 
Drahos and Braithwaite seem to conclude in their article that historically the 
monetary regulation and keenness to control capital markets through banks 
have been the main concern for sovereign states. The argument is supported 
by the fact that IOSCO, which has its interest on creating security regulation 
standards and convergence, was established on 1983; way later than Bretton 
Woods’s institutions and also almost a decade later than establishment of the 
Basel Committee (1974). Therefore widely recognised debate on other than 
global banking and monetary regulation has taken its time to arrive at stage. 
What comes to contemporary debate concerning the regulation of international 
financial markets, there are some educative points to notice from history. 
Capital market integration has had various forms in the past. Still some 
similarities can be found during centuries and therefore historical approach to 
regulation is also in place. As it has been shown by Kindleberger (please see 
Section 2.1.1.) financial crisis tend to have repeating features like tendency of 
international contagion. Still the regulatory entities have not been able to 
prevent, and sometimes not even mitigate, the crisis from eruption. Nation-
states have been exposed to volatilities and crashes in foreign financial 
markets. The key difference on 21st century is that the crises have various 
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possible entry points to the financial system and therefore detecting them is 
not that easy. 
It seems that for long time it was considered that only the control of prudential 
rules of banking system is enough to tackle the possibility of risks on the 
international finance. Given the knowledge of previous decades this obviously 
has not been functioning well or in a satisfactory way. Though prudential rules 
of banking lay an interesting historical example how ‘soft law-self regulation’ 
approach may have significant and efficient results84, at times. 
This example of prudential rules might serve as a useful tool how convergence 
can be sought with the result of better transparency between the market 
places as well as private entities and regulators. The manoeuvre how 
prudential rules were implemented also serves as an example how light touch 
‘best practices’ and soft law orientated approach serves sometimes more 
efficiently than mandatory legislation.  
 
4.2 Recognising the need for structural reform and cooperation before and after the 
crisis that erupted in 2008 
 
4.2.1 Dialogue before the crisis in academic circles 
Among academic circles it has been discussed for quite a time about 
convergence and cooperation on international financial market regulation. 
The interconnection that was steadily increasing on international financial 
markets had aroused the curiosity of legal academics to join the conversation 
on developing the regulatory infrastructure for this changed operational 
environment. The academic conversation accelerated on 2000-2008. At the 
same time it became more and more evident that around the world corporate 
sector looks international financial markets as a major source of new capital.85 
This is once again a clear sign of further market convergence. This fact has 
encouraged even intensified conversations among legal scholars. 
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Also other indicators (please see Section 2.) were showing that multifaceted 
interconnection was deepening while not only corporate sector searched 
capital on international markets but institutional investors were seeking to 
diversify their portfolios by acquiring securities outside the country where they 
were domiciled. Also financial firms were strengthening their presence in the 
international marketplace.86 
It can be considered that the evolving academic literature can contribute, and 
has contributed, valuable insights to the Transatlantic Financial Regulation 
Dialogue. The importance of the academic discussions has been contemplated 
in various studies. Still critics may argue that academic intelligence fails to 
effect on actual policy making due to the reason that politicians tend to lack the 
determination to but ideas into practices when it is not necessary (lack of 
momentum) and the issues are too complex in gaining credit from the public 
i.e. voters.  
 
4.2.2 Actions between EU and U.S. before the crisis – in light of Sarbanes-
Oxley (IFRS / GAAP and Corporate Governance) 
While academic debate was churning the regulators and government officials 
did not stand by doing nothing even though the political landscape was not 
most enthusiastically corresponding to the approach of cooperation. 
International accounting standards and corporate governance issues were the 
main topics of the actual actions on EU-US financial regulatory development 
on the early 2000.87 
Major concessions for companies under IFRS accounting standards were 
made. They are no longer subject to report also under GAAP in U.S. but U.S. 
authorities recognise the IFRS standards as suitable and comparable 
accounting standard.88 
At this time Union did not have such a clear regulatory and supervisory 
structure than nowadays. Also it seemed that academic arguments did not 
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manage to break the political line in a way that regulatory initiatives would 
have passed to enforcement actions. It needed the Lehman to come before 
enthusiasm surged. Also it could be stated that at the moment Union has a 
comparable regulatory / supervisory organisational structure with clearer 
jurisdiction as it will we assessed and illustrated on Section 4.3.  
 
4.2.3 Accelerated enthusiasm to enhance global regulation after Lehman 
Brothers collapse 
The G-20 nations89 were the group which declared the need for improvements 
on global financial markets’ regulatory framework after the financial crisis 
struck worldwide on September 2008 after Lehman filed for bankruptcy. After 
G-20 declaration / agreement / statement on September 200990 the legislators 
on various countries have created new regulation for financial markets under 
their jurisdiction. There has not been signed any significant treaties which 
would harmonize the legislation between different jurisdictions albeit the 
politician were utterly demanding cooperation approach to deal with the issue. 
Though, the passed new regulation, in various jurisdictions, is based on the 
commonly declared principles and there is certain oversight in this respect 
(soft law, SRO’s). 
It can be concluded, given the latest example of actual development on 
regulatory framework that even the academics were discussing and setting 
policy initiatives in front of the regulators and politicians, the decision makers 
were only keen to act after the crisis had swept the markets. Also it can be 
concluded that it seems international regulatory initiatives need to be delivered 
from top down i.e. academic circles had the lack of impact to force enactment 
and implementation on passing their voice to political level. This means it can 
be argued that unfortunately some sort of crisis is needed to deliver political 
support for reforms, and by that way speed up the regulatory process. On the 
other hand it can be argued that regulators were on the map regarding the 
need for reforms. European Commission and SEC were preparing and 
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discussing separately and jointly about the need for convergence in creating 
stronger EU-US partnership and open transatlantic markets for the 21st 
century91. Though, any significant results were not gained on this respect 
before the crisis of 2008. 
On next sections I will quickly summarize the principles of new legislation and 
regulation amendments which have been implemented after the financial crisis 
of 2008-2010 in U.S. and EU. The more specific touch is concentrated to EU 
because the newly passed regulatory initiatives and the supervisory structure 
finally establishes the Union’s jurisdiction and legitimacy to rule more 
decisively on financial regulation. 
Given the scope of the study there will not be conducted a comprehensive 
comparison on the new legislation on EU and U.S. In the future there should 
be concluded studies on the differences between new EU financial regulations 
and directives in comparison to corresponding Dodd-Frank Act in U.S. Still it 
can be considered too early to state explicitly what implications to practice this 
enacted legislation has. There is a lack of practice and existing jurisprudence 
on this regard. The purpose of this study is to frame possible juridical 
approaches to new cooperative practices what regulators / supervisors could 
implement in practice in relation to cross-border transactions and supervision 
of multijurisdictional entities on transatlantic financial markets, in principle. 
 
4.3 US and EU regulatory authorities and their mandate for cooperation in 
contemporary financial markets 
 
4.3.1 Definite federal structure of US – regulation and supervision 
authorities, their legislative framework and recent developments 
In comparison to EU’s regulatory and supervisory authorities the mandates for 
U.S. corresponding ones are more definite due to the clear federal structure of 
the U.S. judicial and political system. Even though in this study EU is 
considered, in various contexts, as a semi federal judicial entity, the difference 
between US and EU is still notable. 
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EU has various federal elements but some still can argue that federal structure 
is not that definite that is the case with US. Therefore it takes more juridical 
arguments to explain on which grounds the regulatory power of EU-authorities 
could rule over international cooperation than corresponding entities on U.S. 
The main scrutiny shall be concentrated to US Securities Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) and European Securities and Markets Authority 
(“ESMA”). In some contexts other regulatory organisations will be cited to. 
Definite federal structure as well as long and profound jurisprudence of SEC’s 
wide mandate is easier to illustrate. Therefore in this study it has taken for 
granted that U.S. is a federal state and SEC has a mandate to govern all the 
actions that are in relation to its scope under U.S. federal jurisdiction. Although 
SEC’s mandate shall be examined and explained as well as it is contemplated 
how SEC might be able to justify its extraterritorial engagements. In the 
contrary, as mentioned, EU is a semi-federal entity formed by sovereign 
national states. Thus more scrutiny will be concentrated to picture EU’s 
authorities’ jurisdiction to act regarding financial markets. Some constitutional 
aspects need to be dealt more closely in the EU’s context than in US. 
The fundamental mandate for Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
has remained the same, as of year 1934, despite the evolution of the market 
infrastructure around it and several additional legislative initiatives that have 
passed in to force during decades. SEC considers all its regulatory, 
supervisory and rule creation actions in relation to goals of protecting 
investors, ensuring the efficiency and transparency of US markets, and 
facilitating capital formation in the US.92 Commentators as well as SEC itself 
interpret its mandate to be broad authority to rule all and every aspect of the 
financial industry in US.93 
SEC pictures itself as an active actor which does not only have a possibility to 
govern securities markets but a mandatory duty to do so. SEC’s interpretation 
of its position in the society reaches even deeper to enforcement practice. 
SEC considers that under its jurisdiction it has a mandate to help in creating 
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jobs and improving living conditions for Americans. In order to do so it acts 
promoting the capital formation that is necessary to sustain economic growth. 
SEC considers that the main tool to achieve the mentioned goals is to ensure 
the proper supply of information for investors: 
“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States 
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large 
institutions or private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts 
about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. To achieve 
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and 
other information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for 
all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a 
particular security. Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and 
accurate information can people make sound investment decisions. The result 
of this information flow is a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital 
market that facilitates the capital formation so important to our nation's 
economy.”94 
As it has been argued on the American legal literature the changes on real 
operational environment of financial markets have led to the situation where 
SEC needs to re-evaluate its position regarding to international context. Even 
though SEC’s mandate remains the same, scholars argue that financial 
markets are so interconnected and they operate cross-borders among 
jurisdictions that viewing them in isolation will no longer serve SEC in order to 
comply with its core functions. 
Vigorous advocates for this approach have been e.g. Ethiopis Tafara and 
Robert J. Peterson which both have served as SEC’s officials. They have been 
raising these concerns already before the latest crisis on 2007. Their 
argumentation goes even further that in order to actually comply with its 
fundamental mandate SEC does not have any other possibility than start 
operating by new cooperative means with its foreign counterparties.95  
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Similar tones have been raised by Edward F. Greene who has a long history in 
banking and legal business from both sides of the Atlantic. In his commentary 
note to Tafara’s and Peterson’s Blueprint Greene highlights that SEC has 
taken no significant steps toward improving the access of US investors to non-
US markets since the adoption of Rule 15a-6, which has supplemented 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as of 1989 and which provides an exemption 
of certain foreign broker-dealers.96 
The critics of SEC nationalistic policy approach state that even though there 
have been clear legal principles to enhance market participation for foreign 
investors, the SEC have failed to do so. Greene refers to the concept of 
‘investor-friendly substituted compliance’.97 In a matter fact he takes an 
example from another US governmental entity US Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) which has put to use its ‘Part 30 Rules’98 that enable to 
grant a non-US firm an exemption from compliance with certain requirements. 
The advocates of open cross-border cooperation have had the tendency to 
refer that SEC (as well as CFTC) must emphasise their mandate to facilitate 
capital formation and thus the need for more flexible cross-border interaction 
which would decrease transaction cost for market participants. During the 
2000s US regulatory scheme has been criticised as costly and inefficient in 
light of cross-border investment.99 On the other hand the critics of ‘investor 
friendly’ approach express that when efficiency is raised as a key issue there 
might be created, unwillingly, a shortage in the perspective of investor 
protection, as mentioned above in this Thesis. 
For example, in US Partnoy and Stoutt in the field of law, have been prolonged 
critics of the ‘efficiency approach’. They claim that investors themselves, as 
regulators also, lack the ability to protect the investors and to detect frauds. 
The arguments of critics can be interpreted in a way that the concept of 
investor protection has not been understood properly among regulators and 
academics in the field of securities law. It is claimed that legal scholars and 
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regulators have a tendency in which they derive their opinions from the law 
and economics analyses’ that believes in ‘rational expectations’ investor model 
or ‘reasonable investor’. In this model the investors are described 
sophisticated who can pick the correct securities, are well aware of the risks 
that certain securities include and can safeguard themselves contractually 
without deep governmental intervention in order to protect them.100 
Even though the critics of ‘efficiency approach’ are mainly concerned about 
investor protection itself they are also sceptical about SEC’s international 
cooperation while they fear that this would deteriorate US investor protection. 
The argumentation does not deny SEC’s fundamental mandate to act on the 
international field. It seems that core of the critics is to challenge the point of 
view which has been seen more a legal theoretical question: how juridical 
professionals think that investors call their decisions; so from which 
perspective and how they should be regulated? This theoretical question, how 
scholars on law should treat investors as regulated entities in the future, shall 
be dealt more in depth on Sections 6 and 7.  
In conclusion it can be noted that SEC’s mandate to participate in international 
cooperation is not forbidden and it has been argued, among scholars, that it 
should take this sort of actions. The constitutionality of its powers has not been 
that heavily tested among academic circles. The critics point has mainly been 
concentrated on which means SEC should use and which ends to promote on 
its international cooperation. According to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and 17 Code of Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”), SEC may, under its discretion 
participate for example information exchange with foreign entities.101 
The above referred cooperation has mainly applied to investigation of criminal 
charges i.e. securities frauds, insider trading, corruption or market 
manipulation cases. The mentioned paragraphs determine reciprocal 
principles on information sharing: to both receive and deliver information 
abroad under certain guidelines. 
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In addition, SEC notes on its own web-page that it considers possessing 
powers to “enforcement-related information sharing on a multilateral, bilateral, 
and ad hoc basis”. These arrangements are mainly done through memoranda 
of understanding (“MOU”). Good example is IOSCO principles. In generally the 
problem (and also benefit to some regard) of these MOUs is that they are only 
guidance in principle without binding obligations. 
Could U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and U.S. Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”), as independent and 
proactive actors in international cooperation, be an example to SEC? 
“Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is to protect market 
participants and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and 
systemic risk related to derivatives – both futures and swaps – and to foster 
transparent, open, competitive and financially sound markets.”102 
The aforementioned quotation has been taken from the agency’s web page. 
CFTC’s mission does not differ that much from the wording of SEC’s task even 
though both agencies are working slightly separate fields of financial 
regulation. CFTC’s focus is on commodity futures and swaps, e.g. derivatives 
related to oil, soybean, wheat etc. CFTC is not the core of this study but given 
its more active role, than SEC’s so far, in participating to the international 
regulatory cooperation on financial markets, it is worthwhile to have a review to 
CFTC’s mandate and actions which the agency is applying. Same notice 
applies with the FRB; it is not the fundamental interest of the study but still it is 
another US governmental entity which has incorporated ‘substituted 
compliance approach’ on the cross-border actors in relation to foreign 
banks.103 FRB is the key of the US Federal Reserve System (“Fed” or “US 
Central Bank”) which main function is to provide safer, more flexible and stable 
monetary and financial system in the US104. 
Commentators like Edward Greene have argued, already before the most 
recent financial crisis, that SEC should take these agencies as a guideline and 
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start applying the similar practices as aforementioned entities. Greene has 
noted that when there is a comparable regulatory system in a non-US firm’s 
home country and certain safeguards are in place to protect US investor’s then 
there should be no reasons not to apply and / or grand possible exemptions 
and reliefs for non-US entities.105  
The economic arguments that legal scholars have adapted pertaining to 
international ‘substituted compliance’ approach is that breaking down the 
barriers between US financial markets and comparably regulated non-US 
financial markets will benefit both US and non-US market participants. If there 
are no extra burdens for cross-border engagement then markets are truly open 
and this creates more liquidity that helps the efficient capital formation on both 
sides of the Atlantic, the advocates’ state. This will, according to their 
argumentation, also reduce the cost of capital.106 If the cost of capital 
decreases, it could be furthermore argued that investment activity increases 
which will spur economic growth and create more jobs inside the jurisdictions 
whose regulators apply this cooperative approach of ‘substituted compliance’ 
and / or ‘mutual recognition’. The terms ‘substituted compliance’ and ‘mutual 
recognition’ shall be dealt further on the study. 
It can be considered that the main goal and merit of this argumentation is the 
ability to illustrate existence of legal regulatory mandate which allows US 
financial supervisors to participate on international cooperation; as FRB and 
CFTC have done. The academic rationale, among both economic and legal 
scholars, goes that not only the markets have changed and regulation has to 
adapt but also regulatory entities have to step up proactively to facilitate, 
promote and enhance this cross-border interaction.  
Critics can, once again, point out that are the current economic rationales 
(‘rational / reasonable investor’) behind the legal scholars’ argumentation valid. 
Also it is notable that the current debate of appropriate financial regulation for 
21st century is practical in nature. It seems that securities law experts do not 
concentrate their focus on the theories behind mainstream interpretations of 
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law and economics. The ‘rational investor’ approach has been often taken as 
granted. 
Therefore it could be argued that more theoretical approach across the 
borderlines of different sciences, as well as inside the juridical fields, should be 
in place to enhance financial regulation’s correspondence to the real needs of 
societies. This phrasing of a question shall be examined more in forthcoming 
Sections of the Thesis. 
 
4.3.2 European Union and its mandate to act on financial regulation107 – 
inside the Single Market as well as represent the Union and its member 
states towards third parties 
SEC’s position, mandate and legitimacy are undisputable. Though, its charter 
and legal basis have been opened to scrutiny, to some extent in this study, 
mainly in relation to SEC’s jurisdiction on international cooperation. In the EU’s 
context it is worthwhile to delve into the regulatory structure a bit deeper. 
Union’s financial market regulation has a shorter history and practice than in 
the States and EU’s financial regulatory entities are newly established. 
Also it is notable that Union still is a combination of sovereign national states, 
not a pure federalist state as if US even though EU has strong federalist 
characters when it comes to Union judicial system and its effects to member 
states as well as individuals residing on those states. For purposes of this 
study it is reasonable to address the Union’s financial regulation structure and 
the entities governing the regulation and supervision; as well as the basis in 
which they derive their mandate. 
Also it is notable difference, in relation to US, that National Financial 
Supervisors are not played out from the picture. They are still vital actors under 
their national jurisdiction. Therefore the field, especially in enforcement, of 
Union wide financial supervision is still in its infancy. Though, the praxis of the 
European Union law, in jurisprudence and policy creation, has a lot to provide 
                                                     
107 In this study the term ‘regulation’ is to refer all sorts of regulatory concepts: laws, directives and 
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for transatlantic cross-border regulatory cooperation, given the fact that Union 
has succeeded to integrate 28 sovereign national legal systems under the 
same juridical umbrella. 
EU-entities’ mandate to enact, regulate and supervise need to be well argued 
regarding every branch of law and particular policy initiatives. As well as EU’s 
general jurisdiction and where it derives from are to be justified and referred 
before every action. The core of EU and its judicial power is without arguing 
concept of Single Market (also referred as Internal Market or Common Market). 
If a matter is to be considered an issue of the Single Market, EU has exclusive 
authority over it. The key idea is that all factors of production can move freely 
across the member states. Union’s entities have a jurisdiction by all means in 
order to guarantee the proper functioning of the Single Markets. This legal 
concept that guarantees the basis for Single Market is also referred as Four 
Fundamental Freedoms (“FFF”); free movement for: 
 i) People 
 ii) Goods 
 iii) Services 
 iv) Capital108 
The legal core basis of the EU is established in two treaties, as referred above: 
Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”) and Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (“TFEU”) (together as “Treaties”). All Union member states 
have signed and adapted the Treaties. By doing this they have decreased their 
sovereignty on some extent. 
All Union regulations and directives need to be justified through Treaties i.e. 
their legal basis need to derive from them. To put it bluntly, there is no Union 
entity that could exist or have power to enact, regulate and / or supervise on 
certain policy area without reference or connection to the Treaties or to the 
rules and principles that could be justified from the Treaties. Same applies to 
all policy decisions itself: in case the Treaties do not deliver enactment power 
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V, articles 114, 115. 
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on certain policy area, then the Union entities do not possess jurisdiction 
regarding the subject in hand. 
The aforementioned principles apply to the Union’s operations itself but what 
do the Treaties and FFF’s guarantee for citizens and businesses e.g. 
participants on the financial markets inside the Union? Professor Klaus-Dieter 
Borchardt sums the concept as follows: 
“Freedom results directly from peace, unity and equality. Creating a larger 
entity by linking 27 States affords at the same time freedom of movement 
beyond national frontiers. This means, in particular, freedom of movement for 
workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, free 
movement of goods and free movement of capital. These fundamental 
freedoms guarantee business people freedom of decision-making, workers 
freedom to choose their place of work and consumers’ freedom of choice 
between the greatest possible varieties of products. Freedom of competition 
permits businesses to offer their goods and services to an incomparably wider 
circle of potential customers. Workers can seek employment and change job 
according to their own wishes and interests throughout the entire territory of 
the EU. Consumers can select the cheapest and best products from the far 
greater range of goods on offer that results from increased competition.”109 
This statement and point of view could be interpreted in a way that EU 
individuals possess a subjective right (legal guarantee) to participate on cross-
border financial markets inside the Single Markets. Further on it could be 
concluded that Union needs to protect and enhance the possibility for its 
residents to participate on these markets. 
The obvious follow-up question is how are these rights protected; supervised 
and enforced inside the Single Market? The highest interpreter of Union law is 
the European Union Court (“EUC”). EUC’s precedents have guided the 
development and establishment of Union law principles throughout the 
European Communities’ history. The national courts and authorities are 
obliged to apply and follow the interpretation of the EUC. Also national courts 
can inquire interpretation guidance from EUC to certain Union law dilemma 
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that is on their table. This is called the ‘Preliminary reference procedure’ after 
which EUC delivers its ‘preliminary ruling’ that binds the pleading national 
court. 110 
A few main principles of EU-law which are established explicitly by the Treaties 
or by EUC or by both and which are applicable when analysing the Union’s 
approach on financial regulation are, as follows: 
i) Union law’s direct effect / applicability: Member States nationals can 
plead in courts and authorities directly to Union law. States have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals.111 This applies straightforwardly to regulation. It applies also 
to directive in case member states have not implemented it in a duly 
manner and if the directive constitutes an explicit rule, right and / or 
obligations. Possibility to plead directly to a rule established by a 
directive does not apply for cases between individuals. 
ii) The primacy of Union law: Union law takes precedence over 
national law if the two conflict.112 
iii) Interpretation of national law in line with the Union law: national law 
is to be interpreted in accordance with Union law; i.e. in accordance 
with the directives. This prevents matters from being differentiated at 
national level which have just been harmonised at Union level by 
means of the directive.113 
iv) Subsidiarity and proportionality principles: Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
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reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.114 
v) Mutual recognition principle: means that a product lawfully marketed 
in one Member State and not subject to Union harmonisation should 
be allowed to be marketed in any other Member State (principal rule; 
allows certain exemptions).115 
So it can be concluded that together the Treaties and EUC’s jurisprudence 
establish the principles for Single Markets which all and every sovereign 
national state and their governmental entities need to apply and respect. In the 
perspective of international financial market regulation, why are these legal 
principles important? It can be considered that these Union law principles, 
together with the FFFs’, establish and protect the integrity and unity of the 
European financial market’s regulatory regime. At the same time this concept 
as a whole enables and justifies the participants, products and services a 
fluent functional environment under the rule of law. 
Therefore it can be argued that the EU’s financial regulations and directives, 
as well as established regulatory entities, together create a comparable unitary 
regime which has the basic abilities to participate on international cooperation 
in enhancing the financial regulation. This definition of ‘comparable regulatory 
regime’ has been seen, among US scholars and SEC officials, as a mandatory 
element for SEC’s cooperation. In the EU context term ‘equivalent’ regimes is 
used. 
After all, is it still legitimate to raise questions as if is the financial market 
regulation even a Union issue at all and to which extent? Is the reality across 
the Union member states such a kind that we can really talk about unitary 
financial market in EU? EU’s financial markets can be considered deeply 
integrated and cross-border transactions have become a reality in recent 
decades.116 Therefore it can be argued that financial markets are actually 
Union wide and converged. 
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One could even ask that in case the reality of the financial markets would not 
be completely transnational and integrated inside the Union should the 
regulatory approach still streamline and harmonize the financial regulation 
among member states. Given the fact, financial markets arguable fit in to 
Union’s ‘exclusive competence’, which derives from the Single Market 
reference; as stated above. Also it could have been easily argued, already 
years ago, that the regulatory effects could ‘be better achieved at Union level’ 
due to the reason that financial markets are interconnected, to some extent, 
and cross-border elements are essential for the phenomenon. This approach 
could be seen, theoretically, as a ‘legislative proactive manner’ to enhance the 
operational environment of finance in order to tear down barriers of cross-
border interaction and to promote financial market actors to expand and 
establish their operations around the Single Market. Furthermore this could be 
seen as a Union’s legislative method to improve efficient capital formation in its 
regime. 
Though, nowadays the aforementioned discussion can be considered solely 
academic. The policy approach itself, which Union has adapted during recent 
decades, already illustrates that financial market regulation is to be considered 
a branch of law under EU’s jurisdiction. Also Union’s clear goal has been to 
support more integrated financial markets in its region. 
The progress in developing Union’s financial regulation has been incremental 
and slow due to the debate concerning appropriate mechanisms and content 
of the regulation. Until now financial legislation is not completely harmonized 
by Union laws among member states. Still significant enhancements have 
been made especially after the most recent financial crisis. At least after the 
mentioned crisis in 2008 it has been obvious that unitary Union wide measures 
are needed not only in policy harmonisation but also in incorporating new 
supervisory entities.  
The modern day financial markets arguable fit in to Union’s ‘exclusive 
competence’ and / or at least the regulatory effects can ‘be better achieved at 
Union level’. Even though all and every aspect of financial legislation is not 
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harmonized by Union laws, through the aforementioned principles, existing 
regulation and established entities unitary regime arguable exists in the Union. 
The Union law principles do not only establish EU entities as active actors in 
relation to international financial cooperation but they can also be used as 
guidelines and basis for this cooperation. The Union’s approach to securities 
regulation has incrementally developed within the philosophy of harmonized 
disclosure standards and mutual recognition; host country recognises the 
legitimacy of home country rules.117 When examining the possibilities of 
deeper transatlantic cooperation the applied EU procedure should be kept in 
mind. It might turn out to be useful practice to confront regulatory issues in 
wider cross-border sense. 
Therefore it is worthwhile to scrutinize certain established practices and 
principles of the Union law even further. Regarding this study the main concern 
shall be on the principle of Mutual Recognition due to the reason that it can be 
considered the most applicable regarding the cooperation on international 
financial markets; given the fact that the main goal of the study is to examine 
possible transatlantic cooperation opportunities on financial markets. 
 
4.3.3 EU’s financial regulation and supervisory structure 
As mentioned above, the EU’s approach in enhancing financial regulation in its 
regime has concentrated on the basis of mutual recognition and partial 
harmonisation. During the 2000 and especially after the recent financial crisis 
the philosophy that Union should do more has gained ground. Herein, as 
follows, are listed a few major passed legislative initiatives regarding securities 
market regulation in EU (the list of initiatives presented herein is not 
comprehensive). After that the focus shall be turned to few specified topics and 
to briefly compare differences between the US and EU as well as to examine 
cooperation possibilities between the jurisdictions.  
As an important first enactment achievement can be considered a Prospectus 
Directive in 2003. The Directive sets out the required principles for securities 
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that are offered to the public in primary markets or admitted trading in 
secondary markets.118 The disclosure requirements are determined in 
accordance with the information requirements set out by IOSCO.119 The 
Transparency Directive which was adopted in 2004 was to increase investor 
protection and transparency by setting out ongoing reporting standards for 
publicly listed companies on exchanges.120 
Also in 2004 the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (“MiFID”) saw 
daylight.121 MiFID has already been set to renewal; the process has been 
divided separately to Market in Financial Instruments Regulation (“MiFIR”) and 
MiFID II. Whereas, MiFIR is regulation from its nature and directly applicable, 
when MiFID II is supposed to be a directive which should be implemented by 
Member States. MiFIR contains provisions on transparency, exchange trading 
of derivatives, product intervention and services by non-EU firms. MiFID II on 
the other hand includes the provisions on authorisation and operating 
conditions on investment firms, passporting of activities across the EU, 
investor protection and powers of national authorities.122 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) delves into Over the 
Counter (“OTC”) derivatives and their clearance procedures in order to 
promote transparency. Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive 
(“AIFMD”) on the other hand will regulate hedge funds and private equity 
funds. 
In this study the closer look shall be directed mainly to AIFMD and at some 
points to EMIR. This approach is supported by the fact EMIR and AIFMD have 
already been under scrutiny in relation transatlantic cooperation between 
authorities in both jurisdictions. 
Parts of the aforementioned directives have already been supplemented or 
amendment procedures are on the way, to some extent. The main notice to be 
considered, regarding regulatory environment as a whole, is that a 
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considerably unitary and new policy framework / regime has been established 
in the EU to strengthen Single Market’s securities regulation, though there is 
still some work to be done in order to achieve as harmonised regulatory 
infrastructure than in US. 
In conclusion it can be stated that EU has taken wide and strong initiative to 
enhance securities regulation under its jurisdiction. Though, the regulatory 
framework can be criticised fragmented and complex. 
Newly established regulatory entities and their mandate shall be assessed on 
the following paragraphs. 
In 2000 European Union’s Economic and Finance Ministers (“ECOFIN”) 
requested so called Wise Men Committee or ‘Lamfalussy Committee’ to 
recommend regulatory changes that could improve the functioning of the 
European Securities Markets. Some of the aforementioned regulatory 
initiatives derived directly from this committee work. Also the supervisory 
infrastructure started to evolve to correspond better to international operational 
environment of the financial markets. It is not useful to delve into details how 
the contemporary financial market supervisory framework was established but 
only to illustrate the current structure of it as follows:  
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123 
For securities supervision ESMA is the key entity. Therefore in this study the 
main interest revolves around ESMA; its jurisdiction and ability act on Single 
Markets and represent the Union towards third parties as mainly in actions with 
the SEC. What comes to ESMA’s mandate; according to the establishing 
regulation ESMA’s main goal can be condensed, as follows:  
The objective of the Authority shall be to protect the public interest by 
contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of 
the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and businesses. The 
Authority shall contribute to: 
(a) improving the functioning of the internal market, including in 
particular a sound, effective and consistent level of regulation and 
supervision, 
(b) ensuring the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly 
functioning of financial markets, 
(c) strengthening international supervisory coordination, 
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(d) preventing regulatory arbitrage and promoting equal conditions of 
competition, 
(e) ensuring the taking of investment and other risks are appropriately 
regulated and supervised, and 
(f) enhancing customer protection.124 
The jurisdiction and justification of the ESMA is well established in its founding 
Regulation and in other related documents thereto (hereinafter jointly “ESMA’s 
charter”). In the aforementioned Regulation’s Article 1 it is referred that ESMA 
should strengthen the international supervisory coordination. Furthermore, it is 
noted in the preamble of the Regulation and in various Articles of the 
importance on enhancing coordination and cooperation among international 
supervisors: 
“…the Authority [ESMA] should foster dialogue and cooperation with 
supervisors outside the Union. It should be empowered to develop contacts 
and enter into administrative arrangements with the supervisory authorities 
and administrations of third countries and with international organisations…”125 
“Those arrangements shall not create legal obligations in respect of the Union 
and its Member States nor shall they prevent Member States and their 
competent authorities from concluding bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
with those third countries.”126 
Why are these Sections of the ESMA’s charter important? These explicit notes 
deliver to the ESMA its mandate, and the scope of it, in relation to international 
actions. Together ESMA’s mandate in its charter and newly passed legislation 
can be seen serving as a comparable regulatory regime with which US entities 
could cooperate. 
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4.4 Comparability and / or equivalence of Dodd-Frank Wall-Street Reform / 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and EU legislation 
As mentioned before, yet it can be considered too early to state explicitly what 
implications to practice the recently enacted legislation has. There is still a lack 
of comprehensive and substantial number of studies in this regard. Also the 
newly established legislations have not been tested and there is a lack of 
jurisprudence. The U.S. government’s supervisory authorities still have a lot to 
play how they deliver the ‘Dodd-Frank rulebook’. Still many of the massive 
1000 page bill’s rules are to come in force incrementally during the upcoming 
years. SEC itself described the process on April 2014 as follows: 
“That Act [Dodd-Frank] contains more than 90 provisions that require SEC 
rulemaking, and dozens of other provisions that give the SEC discretionary 
rulemaking authority. Of the mandatory rulemaking provisions, the SEC has 
proposed or adopted rules for more than three-quarters.”127 
Dodd-Frank’s differences with EU’s EMIR and AIFMD have been assessed by 
law firms and risk management entities.128 It can be concluded in general that 
there are differences between the legislation but they can be seen as 
comparable in respect of cooperation possibilities. Further on in this study it 
shall be assessed few key points in light of cooperative agenda, which 
differences the authorities might have to solve. Especially in relation to AIFMD 
of which has arisen certain debateable political hot spots.129  
 
  
                                                     
127 Dodd-Frank process SEC webpage. 
128 Linklaters and MOFO. 
129 Scott 2012, pp. 978-979. 
  56  
5 Recent flaws – what behaviour and / or actions need to be set under 
international regulatory scrutiny? 
 
5.1 Perspectives on recent financial crisis  
So, what has gone wrong or which behaviour is needed to be tamed for in the 
international financial markets? It has been widely understood that certain 
wrongdoings and / or systematic flaws led to the widespread delivery of e.g. 
complex subprime-products across the international finance system without 
proper transparency on nature of the mentioned products. This eventually 
shook the market infrastructure into chaos and derailed the economic growth 
path to worldwide downturn.130 
We shall assess which concrete perspectives the theoretical discussions may 
provide to the debate on restructuring the regulatory infrastructure of 
international financial markets. The root cause(s) of the financial crisis, and the 
followed slow economic growth pace across the developed countries, might be 
impossible to determine. Nevertheless, some essential flaws are recognized 
quite multifaceted among analytics. Lack of investor protection, lack of 
transparency on products and services and lack of harmonised control in 
relation to recognizing the potential factors of systemic risk, are all to be 
named as flaws that prevailed in the international financial markets before the 
crisis.131 
Considering that the regulatory tasks, for e.g. both ESMA and SEC, requires 
the mentioned entities to protect investors and safeguard the transparency and 
avoidance of systemic risk on financial markets, it can be concluded that 
regulators should be interested in, and even forced, to improving these 
issues.132 Furthermore, when it has concluded that financial markets are 
international in a sense that transactions are conducted cross-border basis on 
these jurisdictions, it is fair to argue that the mentioned regulatory tasks should 
also be completed on inter-jurisdictional level cooperatively. 
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One suitable solution to understand the existed regulatory problems might be 
‘benign big gun’ illustration.133 The theory has it that regulators should treat 
regulated entities well, possibly by means of proper incentives also. If the trust 
is broken then regulators should respond with punishments, in accordance 
with the severity of the breach. The success of this strategy depends on the 
ability to be credibly tough but at the same time reasonable.134 On financial 
regulation, UK’s Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) has been criticised to be 
unduly light-touch and on the other hand U.S. SEC has a fame to deliver 
complex and hard to comply regulation that signal mistrust for anyone 
participating with the financial markets.135 Though, when it comes to SEC’s 
ability to tame the dirty big guns, their actions are more symbolic.136 In the light 
of Benign Big Gun approach, it could be argued that regulators failed to set 
reasonable incentives in order to guide market participants to do well. At the 
same time there was a lack of tough enforcement measures taken proactively 
even supervisors had the reasonable information and a change to conduct 
such enforcement measures137. 
On this regard cooperation could serve to detect the risks that misbehaviour 
creates. Regulatory cooperation could at its best combine the aspects of soft 
law orientated ‘light touch’ and mandatory requirements by setting appropriate 
amount of different types of disclosure requirements. Cooperative 
arrangements might also trim the costly duplicative standards. Therefore 
cooperative approach includes both possibilities: to treat regulatees well by 
decreasing their transaction costs but also it facilitates the possibility to take 
enforcement actions when misdeeds are detected. Of course the problematic 
question over enforcement measures and lack of international tribunals would 
still be present. 
But the question, which sort of approach to use when contemplating the 
international financial market regulation revolves and revolves over and over 
again. Should it be considered that financial market actors are greedy and 
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selfish which need harsh scrutiny, heavy compliance practices and fierce 
punishments. Or could there be found some suitable solution, which can be 
argued by theories and applied into practice that could in the end of the day 
benefit all participants to some extent? Or is it too idealistic to even assume 
so? 
For example, imagine if deeper cooperation between the regulatory authorities 
across borders could decrease some of the transaction cost for participants 
that are operating in a multi-jurisdictional environment. Would this touch deliver 
an incentive to comply, in a theoretical sense, with the current and / or future 
regulation in a more diligent way in order to serve authorities on proactive 
prevention of market failures and possible frauds? 
Addressing this question is complex due to the fact that, as all individuals, the 
financial market actors may not be categorised by their actions or motives 
behind them. It could be concluded that certain participants on the financial 
markets are surely willing to play by the rules and their motive behind the 
participation is legitimate need for funding and / or investment opportunities. 
On the other hand it is obvious that speculators and rule twisters exist and 
have always existed among market actors. Given this multifaceted 
environment the regulation should also be able to serve all the angles of it: to 
encourage the ‘well doers’ to save and invest in order to create flow of capital 
and liquidity on the markets but also to restrict the possibility and eagerness to 
‘misbehave’ that might create systemic risk and deteriorate the legitimacy of 
the financial markets in the eyes of audience and possible investors. 
 
5.2 Is there a need for international financial regulatory cooperation? 
If it can be argued that financial activity needs special regulation and oversight, 
how come the multi-jurisdictional scrutiny is in place? Even though it can be 
argued that financial markets need some sort of special regulation due to its 
unique characters and that the markets have influence and cross-border 
aspects, does it necessary mean that international regulation should be 
delivered? 
  59  
In case some human activity is considered to be controlled with special 
regulation and rules, then it can be considered, by analogy, that whilst the 
phenomenon transforms its form, the regulation has to follow. To put it bluntly: 
when the world around evolves and changes the regulation should adapt too. 
As defined on previous sections, the financial markets nowadays are 
constructed on cross-border basis and internationality in its all forms is utterly 
present on those markets. Therefore it is appropriate to raise a question how 
the regulatory framework could be improved in order to adapt to the prevailing 
conditions of the real world. 
When it comes to regulation of financial markets, it has been concluded that 
market regulation must reflect the market reality.138 Therefore it can be stated 
that while financial markets have become more and more interconnected, the 
regulatory touch should transform also. The remaining question is how the 
regulatory developments should be initiated and which could be the most 
appropriate approach to step forward in enhancing the international financial 
regulation? It is worth to notice that a suitable way to confront the issue would 
be a transatlantic perspective, given the historical and cultural background and 
the market reality.139 The transatlantic perspective would mean the EU-US 
based regulatory cooperation. Herein as conclusions it is worthwhile to raise a 
few questions that can serve as base to forthcoming studies which are to 
contemplate the regulatory cooperation on international financial markets 
between EU and US. 
Especially the following questions are relevant to place under scrutiny: A) How 
to weight investor protection against efficient capital formation in an equitable 
and efficient way, B) what could be the practical applications for regulatory 
cooperation. 
The question A can be confronted by contemplating Law and Economics in a 
critical perspective. The concept of ‘New Property Law’ can also serve as a 
‘tool box’ for exploring the question in light of ‘fundamental right 
sensitiveness’140. For Question B the suitable approach could be examining 
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the recent actual developments on regulatory cooperation between the 
authorities across the Atlantic. Finally the goal could be to combine theoretical 
and practical aspects in order to find some possible useful implications to 
future regulatory processes. It can be considered that studies on this regard 
would be reasonable and useful to conduct. 
On the following sections it is contemplated the possible regulatory 
approaches that could be adapted to construct a better operational 
environment, in legal sense, on international finance. 
 
5.3 Possible Regulatory approaches 
The treaties between sovereign nations regarding international financial 
regulation are seldom; especially when it comes to complete harmonization of 
the legislation. It seems that national governments and regulatory entities have 
had the tendency to consider that binding treaties and strict harmonization of 
the legislation are not the key factors in enhancing the progress of 
contemporary financial regulatory architecture. Though, in international level 
there are certain cooperation bodies to deliver non-binding guidelines and / or 
principles in which the financial regulation should be constructed for. The most 
appropriate and contemplated entity, regarding this study, is the 
aforementioned IOSCO and its principles. IOSCO covers basically all the 
significant market supervisors and regulatory entities around the globe. IOSCO 
principles are not binding in nature. In juridical typology they can be 
determined as information guidance which purpose is to state highly generic 
principles for best possible regulation.141 The nature of this type of guidance is 
to provide an equal opportunity to learn best possible practices from 
corresponding entities. This factor emphasises the fact that certain regulatory 
competition is also in place to facilitate the possibility of legal innovations 
regarding regulation. 
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EU’s securities regulation is developed, especially in recent years, with partial 
harmonisation of regulation on financial market legislation. Clear trend on this 
regard can be pointed out, as determined previously on this study. 
If the treaties itself are not seen as appropriate measures in order to enhance 
international regulatory cooperation, it can be argued that a combination of 
regulatory choices might serve as a suitable option. The information guidance 
principles from IOSCO for example serve as functional basis to steer 
regulatory processes. The political declarations have the same generic impact. 
Together they form a base for partial harmonisation that could serve the global 
financial infrastructure in order to mitigate possibilities of regulatory arbitrage 
and forum shopping. These guidance principles also have the benefit that they 
do not outplay the possibility of healthy regulatory competition. 
It could be characterised that after this partial harmonisation there is room for 
regulatory cooperation in terms of supervisory entities’ administrative 
agreements. They serve as a soft law orientated approach. The agreements 
are not binding in nature but they determine the basis by which regulators can 
apply information sharing mutual recognition and substituted compliance 
procedures whenever it is considered convenient e.g. ad hoc basis. 
Even though the above illustrated approach might seem very authorities’ 
orientated solution, it does not exclude self-regulatory possibilities. The future 
regulatory process on financial markets can be seen as an incremental 
combination of different perspectives to confront the topic. Given the 
complexity of the phenomenon regulation also needs to be innovative and 
flexible by all possibly means. 
 
5.3.1 What mutual recognition and substituted compliance means? 
 
In EU context the principle of mutual recognition is applied. The substituted 
compliance on transatlantic perspective could and should function with the 
same procedure. The function of the principle should be constructed on 
reciprocity. 
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It can be considered that when legal systems are built on comparable cultural, 
legislative and operational environment there can be arguably reasons to apply 
ways of mutual recognition. In EU and US legal infrastructure and financial 
market oversight are based on considerably diligent and efficient compliance 
patterns. Therefore it can be argued that forms of mutual recognition might be 
applicable in transatlantic context. 
Mutual recognition in EU is the principle that a product lawfully marketed in 
one Member State and not subject to Union harmonisation should be allowed 
to be marketed in any other Member State. By this conduct the national 
authorities recognise and respect the regulatory / supervisory resolutions 
executed by other jurisdiction’s authorities. 
Substituted compliance should function on similar principles. When a cross-
border entity or certain product is under regulatory scrutiny and disclosure 
requirements in its home jurisdiction, the host jurisdiction’s authorities withhold 
from certain compliance requirements by substituting their own surveillance 
with home jurisdiction’s regulatory / supervisory actions and thereby granting 
and exemption on certain requirements.  
Mutual recognition and substituted compliance can be determined as 
combined means of mandatory legislation and soft law on regulatory 
cooperation. They might also be seen as partial harmonization of legislation. 
The core principle of both concepts is reciprocity. In order to function properly 
there needs to be comparable regulatory regimes that are based on certain 
similar legal principles. The supervision and enforcement aspects are also to 
be considered essential; they need to be equivalent enough to meet the 
purpose of these procedures. 
EU’s successful history in relation on mutual recognition can be put to use 
while assessing the possibilities to apply this approach on transatlantic 
convergence. In EU the mutual recognition is binding in nature, excluding few 
exemptions. In the transatlantic cooperation mutual recognition and / or 
substituted compliance might serve better when implemented by soft law basis 
which allows the ad hoc evaluation and flexibility. It can be argued that best 
possible and realistic ways to conduct these arrangements are MOUs between 
  63  
regulatory / supervisory organisations. This means that regulatory cooperation 
regarding every product, service provider and participant should be taken 
under consideration individually and a flexible administration agreement 
(MOU) on this regard could be completed on each particular case.  
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6 Mechanisms to understand, illustrate and evaluate forthcoming proceedings 
 
6.1 Legal ‘Trickle-down effect’ on global decision making in relation to 
international financial markets 
In order to illustrate and understand the recent decision making process on 
international financial regulation I have created a concept of ‘legal trickle-down 
effect’142. The concept shortly describes procedural elements by which the 
recent reforms have been (and can be) passed and implemented from G-20 
declaration as actual international rules. The concept assesses how the 
efficient cooperation between financial supervisors and regulators on cross-
border perspective (multi-jurisdictional cooperation) can actually be a crucial 
element for rulemaking in relation to international financial markets. Therefore 
it illustrates how international financial regulation ‘trickles down’ from 
declarative statements to a point where regulators / supervisors are the main 
actors in international rule creation, instead of legislators. 
When it seems that treaties are a too heavy instrument to deal with the issue, 
some alternative solutions are to be sought. The experience from the UK 
shows also the flaws of SRO orientated approach.143 The recent ‘case 
evidence’ has shown that declarative general (soft law) principles to enhance 
the financial regulation are to be delivered from top down politically (G-20).144 
After this the legislators under their jurisdictions have delivered independently 
certain legislative initiatives implementing the declared principles as they have 
seen appropriate to fit the purposes on their home jurisdiction. The described 
practice could be systemised as a soft law orientated partial, non-binding, 
harmonization of regulation between jurisdictions. It is challenging to evaluate 
in which depths the legislative initiatives have been prepared in means of 
cooperation between jurisdictions. FSB of BIS and IOSCO have served as 
proactive parties building a newly established financial regulatory 
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cooperation145 but their power to guide the national legislative initiatives is hard 
to be measured. Nevertheless, the most interesting part on constructing the 
contemporary financial regulatory architecture evolves from the actions which 
are taken after the national legislative procedures. The convergence has been 
sought from regulatory / supervisory cooperation. This approach illustrates the 
possibilities of the mutual recognition / substituted compliance measures which 
could enhance both transparency and efficiency on the markets. For the 
purposes of this study the transatlantic case example is the most suitable 
illustration. 
Memorandums of Understanding are a form of regulatory cooperation 
agreement. In legal hierarchy these MOUs could be systemised as non-
binding intergovernmental agreements, which have steering power but no 
significant enforceability. They could be defined as juridical base which 
legitimises cooperation for governmental authorities. Therefore their legal 
weight is somewhere between SRO rules and decrees. So what makes these 
MOU’s so interesting? 
In their core is the idea and will to enhance cooperation on transatlantic 
financial market regulation. Certainly the MOUs are not creating any sort of 
concrete initiative to harmonization of legislation nor even binding forms of 
mutual recognition or substituted compliance. At least these administrative 
agreements are an endeavour where supervisors on both sides of the Atlantic 
are establishing their mandate for international cooperation. Especially this 
could be seen as an important step for ESMA which is a newly born 
organisation. Therefore these agreements justify and fortify ESMA’s position 
as a seriously taken organisation on the field of international regulatory 
cooperation. 
The core purpose of these administrative agreements (MOUs) is enabling 
information sharing and regulatory actions between supervisory authorities. If 
the possibilities of these agreements are properly used, the information 
sharing can increase transparency on the markets without creating 
unnecessary duplicative disclosure requirements and compliance obligations 
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that have a tendency to increase transaction costs and harm efficient capital 
formation. By using these regulatory cooperation agreements in practice the 
regulators itself create new actual rules (regulation) for international financial 
markets. The nature of these rules can be seen as a mixture of mandatory 
legislation and soft law orientated guidance. When put to use in practice 
incrementally they can create a tradition for future international regulation. 
This final concrete rulemaking phase of ‘legal trickle-down effect’ shall be 
quickly examined on next section. 
 
6.2 How to apply this approach – case example of AIFMD and Dodd-Frank? 
Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (“AIFMD”) is one suitable 
example to contemplate in this study regarding transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation. The implementation of the directive itself is politically and 
economically a hot topic inside the Union as well as on transatlantic cross-
border sense. AIFMD is a directive that concerns the regulation on e.g. Hedge 
Funds and CRAs that are both often utterly interconnected across the Atlantic 
and multijurisdictional entities. Also some say that the mentioned entities were 
part of the root cause(s) of the recent financial crisis in 2008. 
When assessing the appropriateness of AIFMD itself and international 
cooperation pertaining to it, investor protection and efficient capital formation 
can be seen colliding. This reflects a basic juridical question: to which limit 
certain fundamental rights should be protected and by which means. Also it 
challenges to think the purpose of the regulation and by which means these 
set goals can be best achieved. 
Therefore the question over AIFMD can be seen as a challenging topic for 
regulation theory and law and economics. It is also interesting to contemplate 
what concrete possibilities for cooperation there are in this regard; on 
transatlantic regulatory point of view.  
As described above, the illustrative concept of ‘legal trickle-down effect’ serves 
as a way to understand how the contemporary regulatory processes are put 
into practice from declarative ideas to actual international rules. On 2013 SEC 
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and ESMA entered into an administrative agreement (MOU) regarding AIFMD 
and current U.S. regulations (mainly Private Fund Advisers Registration 
Act).146 
The core of this agreement is “to consult, cooperate and exchange 
information”147 regarding entities that operate on a cross-border basis. 
Basically this covers CRAs and Hedge Funds that are functioning on cross-
border basis. This “cooperation will be primarily achieved” by “informal, oral 
consultations, supplemented by more in-depth, ad hoc cooperation”.148 
“Cooperation will be most useful in, but is not limited to, the following 
circumstances where issues of regulatory concern may arise: a) The initial 
application of a Covered Entity for authorization, registration or exemption from 
registration in another jurisdiction…”149 
Hereby the MOU delivers an example on which grounds regulators can 
implement information sharing, mutual recognition and substituted compliance 
measures on particular cases, if needed. Yet, the practice on this regard is 
missing. 
The aforementioned citations to the MOU concludes the findings of this study 
that after the heads of states have declared (G-20) the need to enhance 
regulation on financial markets and the legislators under their jurisdictions 
have passed enabling legislation, the final phase of supervisory and 
enforcement actions can be conducted by regulatory / supervisory entities 
through these administrative agreements. On the final phase of this study I will 
contemplate the main questions what regulatory / supervisory entities could 
weight while completing these cooperation duties under the mentioned 
agreements. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
7.1 Regulators mandate for international cooperation and rationale to act 
One of the core purposes of this study was to assess the mandates for 
financial regulatory / supervisory organisations regarding their ability to 
international cooperation. The interest was on transatlantic entities, especially 
on ESMA and SEC. As it has been concluded the aforementioned entities 
possess the ability to participate on regulatory cooperation. Some might even 
argue that their fundamental existence requires them to do so; given the fact 
that the operational environment of international financial markets has 
converged and multi-jurisdictional operations and participants are reality in the 
contemporary nature of the financial markets as illustrated in the study. 
It can be concluded that all the elements for transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation are in place. The main questions revolve around the problems 
how to conduct this cooperation and which are the key perspectives to assess 
regarding possible cooperation. The last sections of this study are devoted to 
contemplate obstacles and possibilities for such cooperation as well as to legal 
weighting that needs to be executed in particular resolution situations. 
 
7.2 Conclusions and perspectives on possibilities for future cooperation; legal 
weighting concerning the resolution situations 
It may very well be stated that in order to comply with widely recognised 
IOSCO-principles for sound financial markets, the regulatory entities need to 
focus on one essential commodity: information. Information is money on 
financial markets. In contemporary society value of information and value of 
marketization are clear tendencies, as noted for example in the context of New 
Property Law.150 Individuals characterises themselves as market actors and by 
market terms. Therefore it might be argued that cooperation in international 
regulatory environment needs to be assessed in light of these tendencies 
affecting in societies. 
                                                     
150 Pöyhönen 2000. 
  69  
In this chapter it shall be dealt the aspects regarding authorities’ possibilities to 
regulate the information on transatlantic financial markets in an appropriate 
manner as well as authorities’ possibilities on safeguarding the functioning 
market environment. Few essential questions which will be under juridical 
weighting with pro et contra arguments, in light of relevant theoretical aspects 
and political reality, are assessed. This assessment can serve as base not 
only for regulators but also in all types of legal resolution situations pertaining 
to the matter. Four examined aspects are as follows: 
i) investor protection versus efficient capital formation 
ii) freedom of investor versus governmental paternalism 
iii) mandatory legislation versus flexible soft law approach 
iv) European versus American approach to cooperation 
As discussed above regulation of financial markets is a multifaceted problem 
which spreads across legal branches. Therefore, when conducting these final 
assessments the phenomenon is intended to be contemplated in 
comprehensive manner in which all borderlines between legal branches are 
disregarded. 
 
Investor protection vs. effective capital formation 
IOSCO principles, federal legislation in the U.S. and EU’s regulations and 
directives are constructed more or less with the same fundamental goals. Also 
the regulators / supervisors across the Atlantic have a comparable 
fundamental mandate which they should promote, as noted in this study. 
Finding the balance between appropriate investor protection and facilitating the 
efficient capital formation, is a core issue to solve in relation to regulatory 
cooperation. It can be stated that many times these goals collide and legal 
weighting need to be executed. At first, in every particular resolution situation 
there should be recognised the operational environment of the contemplated 
issue as well as participating interest quarters and their possible risk positions. 
When these issues are recognised, particular regulatory solution can be 
sought. Normally all the participants for certain type of financial activity have 
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their positions covered by one or more fundamental rights. When 
contemplating investor protection versus efficient capital formation, it can be 
seen that property protection and freedom of trade might collide on several 
resolution situation. As mentioned information can be considered essential 
commodity on financial markets, therefore the core of the legal weighting 
between parties could be seen as balancing between appropriate and 
sufficient transparency which serves and protects the fulfilment of the core of 
the fundamental rights for each party. 
Under the concept of New Property Law this sort of balancing is defined as 
weighting in accordance with the transparency principle. To put it bluntly, 
weighting needs to be executed in order to safeguard all parties’ sufficient 
fulfilment of their information interests. This weighting should be conducted in 
light of the principle of proportionality, with situation sensitive approach. 
In practice when contemplating the content of regulatory cooperation or 
particular resolution situation it should be considered how it is possible to place 
sufficient information disclosure requirements in order to protect investors 
without harming too much the liberty of trade and efficient capital formation. 
Each situation, product and type of service provider should be evaluated 
separately without general doctrine. But aforementioned general tools can be 
put to use in all occasions. The principles of reciprocity, proportionality and 
equality should be used when evaluating regulatory approach to similar 
transactions in all market place. 
The benefits of this approach are that each case can be evaluated in light of 
situation sensitiveness in order to conclude an appropriate resolution in 
particular case. The critics might state that this creates risks in relation to legal 
safety pertaining to lack of consistency on resolutions. But it can be argued 
that this evaluation process itself embraces equality which protects the legal 
safety on this respect. 
The arguments in favour of investor protection approach are that with placing 
sufficient amount of mandatory disclosure requirements investors can 
genuinely assess their own risk position and also risk positions of other 
participants on the market. This enhances transparency also in relation to 
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regulators that they can detect possibly arising systemic risks and also 
proactively prevent frauds on the markets. Also the investor protection 
orientated approach increases the trust and fiduciary aspects between market 
participants and for markets itself. It can be argued that this approach 
increases the willingness to participate on markets and therefore in the long 
run increases liquidity, investment opportunities and decreases the cost of 
capital. Therefore enhancements on investor protection can be justified due to 
the reason that it facilitates economic growth, job creations and general 
welfare. Also investor protection itself can be seen as protection of 
fundamental proprietary rights and therefore it may legitimate public opinion 
towards financial markets. 
On the other hand increasing disclosure requirements can increase transaction 
costs and can be seen as a partial intervention to liberty of trade. Disclosure 
standards can be criticised from their suitability. Following questions might be 
asked. 
We might ask is it appropriate that more and more entities are obliged to 
produce publicly available information in order to promote transparency. What 
benefits it would provide, if amount of information would increase, given that 
we are already living in the middle of information flood in which essential 
knowledge is hard to contemplate comprehensively? Is producing information 
a value itself or should it have a concrete benefit in it? Is it enough that 
investors have more information or should the information be examined more 
closely by regulators? Is there sense to create regulatory burden unless there 
is no one that had the time to comprehensively investigate the provided data? 
While balancing the appropriateness of disclosure standards it should be 
evaluated if there can be achieved concrete results by setting on a particular 
requirement. If explicit transparency advantage, which increases the 
confidence on the markets between participants or delivers regulators 
improved opportunity to supervise risks and prevent frauds, cannot be seen 
clearly, the standard should not be placed into practice.  
Therefore it can be concluded that while regulators are contemplating the 
material content of their cooperation, they should always be able to justify their 
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actions regarding disclosure standards with clear benefit that regulatory action 
brings in relation to transparency. Otherwise the authorities should withdraw 
from the certain action.  
 
Freedom of investor versus governmental paternalism 
As stated in this study the securities law scholars tend to derive their juridical 
arguments pertaining to regulation from the concept of ‘reasonable / rational 
investor’. When contemplating the regulatory cooperation and resolution 
situations, weighting should be executed between investor freedom and 
concept of governmental paternalism. While completing this weighting the idea 
of reasonable investor can be questioned, in light of the perspectives 
presented herein study. 
Rationality of investors can be questioned as stated by behavioural economic 
scholars. But even though the rationality would be missing from particular 
transaction decisions, can governmental paternalism be justified or should the 
investors’ freedom allow them to do mistakes on the markets. This question 
shall be assessed by balancing systemic risk perspectives with the individual 
freedoms. 
Individual mistakes are part of the liberty of economic activity. But in which 
occasions this freedom to conduct mistakes should be tamed by governmental 
paternalism? Liberty of investor can be supported by argument that in case 
individual economic actors do not have the risk of failure, the whole concept of 
market economy in which failures are an essential part of it, is in question. 
Governmental paternalism on the other hand can be supported by argument 
that functioning markets itself has evolved as a fundamental right in principle 
and governmental obligation is to act in order to facilitate functioning markets. 
In regulatory cooperation weighting is to be executed between protecting the 
functioning markets and enabling the natural elements of liberty to failure. 
Some might argue that functioning markets itself need the sufficient possibility 
of failure. But in this context failure can be seen as an action that creates 
systemic risk for functioning markets. Therefore it could be argued that 
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investors’ freedom to fail need to be placed under regulatory scrutiny to some 
extent. 
Once again, every particular resolution situation needs to be contemplated 
individually. Principal rule should be the protection of freedom of trade which 
includes liberty to fail. But in occasions when systemic risk comes in to play, 
there should be executed regulatory cooperation actions proactively where 
these risks could be mitigated. The problem of this approach is that there are 
numerous entry points for systemic risks and detecting them in a regulatory 
process beforehand might be challenging. 
Regarding governmental paternalism a good argument by Lynn A. Stoutt, 
should be remembered. After losing their money on frauds that should have 
been detected by regulators, the investors rarely take it calmly without 
complaining the authorities of their inaction. Of course legal systems offer 
remedy option on this regard but the appropriate level of governmental 
paternalism should be implemented proactively in order to justify the legitimacy 
and functioning of the markets.  
 
Mandatory legislation versus flexible soft law approach 
As stated in this study, rules can be approached from various perspectives. 
The essential argument in every particular case should be the evaluation of 
how well the chosen mean serves the end in light of proportionality and 
appropriateness. The weighting between investor protection and efficient 
capital formation as well as balancing with investors’ freedom to fail and 
governmental paternalism are the material part of the juridical choices for 
regulatory cooperation. Discussions between mandatory legislation and soft 
law approach as well as assessing the Europeanization versus U.S. 
perspective on regulatory cooperation can be considered procedural aspects 
of the cooperation.  
Mandatory legislation would have the benefits that regulatory arbitrage and 
competition on the financial markets would decrease. Also mandatory 
legislation can be supported by the argument that soft law guidance is not 
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enforceable and does not constitute explicit obligations with sanctions if 
infringed. 
Soft law orientated approach to deal with international financial markets 
regulation can be seen as a flexible approach. The administrative agreements 
between ESMA and U.S. which have been delivered as examples of 
cooperation in this study can be claimed to have the benefit that they leave 
more discretion in particular cases. Therefore soft law guidance on regulatory 
cooperation enables the situation sensitive weighting. Also it may very well be 
argued that certain amount of regulatory competition is vital in order to 
facilitate legal innovations. This supports the soft law touch. 
Complete harmonisation of regulation and binding cooperation treaties can be 
argued to be politically unrealistic option, given the fact that pending 
transatlantic trade negotiations in relation to investment protection clauses and 
their dispute resolution are hindered by political opposition. Also it might be 
wise to consider that there should not be made a strict borderline for 
mandatory legislation and soft law orientated approach. Sometimes the 
chosen regulatory approach can include elements from mandatory rules and 
soft law guidance. They could be put to use simultaneously. 
 
European versus American approach to cooperation 
As contemplated in this study the U.S. has a long unitary (federal) history of 
financial regulation. On the contrary EU entities and unitary European 
approach are both notably young in this respect. Though, the academic 
discussions on convergence of international financial regulation have more 
history in U.S., EU has its benefits too. It is worthwhile to search guidance from 
the EU’s history on incorporating 28 different regulatory systems and market 
places together. Also the EU authorities’ freshness can turn as a benefit due to 
the reason that they do not have deeply rooted and established practices. 
Therefore they might be more flexible in adapting to the contemporary 
environment. 
  75  
In generally, regulatory entities should abandon their trenches in relation to 
endeavouring to extent their extra juridical powers. This can be done by means 
of cooperation by administrative agreements that implement mutual 
recognition, substituted compliance and information exchange. But should this 
cooperation be approach more from American perspective or European? 
American legal scholars on securities regulation have had the tendency to 
constitute their argumentation on the basis of ‘rational investor’ or ‘reasonable 
investor’. Therefore their praxis has revolved around the question of efficiency 
and how juridical solutions can serve to support efficient capital formation and 
functioning markets. Also the U.S. financial markets are still the most attractive 
and liquid market place. Supported by the fact Chinese e-commerce giant 
Alibaba’s recent IPO in New York. Therefore American approach can be stated 
as more suitable.  
EU on the other hand has a substantial track record on mutual recognition and 
multijurisdictional intergovernmental operations. Given the fact that these 
might be the procedural elements for future cooperation, EU orientated 
approach can be supported. Also EU could deliver valuable aspects in relation 
to investor protection orientated arguments. 
 
7.3 Final words – few principles 
This study can be criticised as abstract and theoretical. Though, it was a 
suitable solution to picture international financial markets generally and 
theoretically as a multifaceted phenomenon so that the diversity of legal 
aspects pertaining to the matter in hand could be illustrated properly. One key 
purpose of the study was to contemplate the elements and framings of 
questions for forthcoming studies that can delve into the topic more in detail. In 
conclusion few final remarks need to be noted on this regard. 
The current situation on the international financial markets is challenging in 
juridical perspective. Given the fact that there are no general treaty based 
solutions to supervise the interconnected markets, the juridical resolutions 
need to be sought elsewhere. Also the lingering problem is that there are no 
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intergovernmental regulatory / supervisory entities which had the power to 
implement enforcement actions with international jurisdiction. Also the 
international special tribunals are missing. Given the arisen tension on 
transatlantic trade negotiations on this regard, there is no enhancement on the 
horizon. 
So, other solution should be implemented. One of the core assessments on 
this study was the possibilities for transatlantic regulatory cooperation. 
Regulation itself cannot solve problems that are economical by nature. 
Though, appropriate regulatory environment can serve as a risk prevention 
tool in order to detect, prevent and mitigate systemic risk and safeguard the 
functioning markets. Also regulation can serve as a tool to develop societies. 
On this regard the transatlantic regulatory cooperation has lot to offer. 
As studied on the Thesis, information is essential commodity on the markets. 
Controlling and facilitating appropriate information needs for market 
participants should be the key element for regulatory cooperation. By 
controlling the disclosure requirements authorities can guarantee the 
appropriate level of transparency on the markets. 
In particular legal resolution situation the authorities should contemplate the 
efficiency aspects as well as safeguarding the functioning markets and 
reasonable protection of fundamental rights. As stated before, a toolkit for legal 
weighting can include elements from fundamental right orientated balancing in 
order to protect appropriately the risk positions of the participants on the 
markets. Efficiency with transparency is not an oxymoron either. As 
mentioned, if appropriate level of transparency on the transatlantic financial 
markets can be guaranteed by regulatory cooperation, the transaction costs 
might actually decrease. This would in an idealistic situation improve efficient 
capital formation and functioning of the markets. Therefore the regulators 
should embrace cooperation and use comprehensive toolkit while executing 
particular operations on the grounds of administrative cooperation agreements. 
One important issue to contemplate in the future might be the question, which 
role the national supervisory authorities inside the EU would have in practice 
when the cooperation between ESMA and SEC is implemented. 
